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i 
Abstract 
The Rwandan people encountered genocide against Tutsis in 1994. The 
ethnic cleansing led to the exile of many Rwandan people and the 
constitution of diasporic communities in Africa, Europe, Australia and 
Northern America. Many Rwandans residing in Finland and Belgium 
after surviving the 1994 genocide and its aftermath went through such 
tragedy that they still suffer from the social wounds that the ethnic 
violence and genocide left them with. After a traumatic experience, it is 
very significant for the survivors to preserve a good mental and 
psychological health and have healing strategies to cope with their 
trauma.  
The overall aim of this thesis aims is to study social suffering 
experienced and expressed by survivors of the Rwandan genocide 
against Tutsis and its aftermath, who nowadays reside in the diaspora 
both in Finland and Belgium. More particular aims are to (a) provide an 
analysis of the role of the church before and after the genocide, (b) 
explore how frequent various forms of traumatic experiences during the 
genocide are among member of the diaspora in Finland, (c) compare the 
mental well-being of victims of rape during the genocide with the mental 
well-being of those who were born as a result of such rape, and (d) 
investigate coping methods and compare services aiming at trauma 
healing among genocide victims in Belgium and in Finland. It puts 
emphasis on the experience and narratives of how Rwandan migrants 
conceptualize and give meanings to their social suffering and how they 
cope with their traumatic situation psychologically and culturally 
meaningful ways, and through Western justice. 
Questionnaires were distributed in 27 different locations of Finland 
and Belgium in schools and in churches (13 locations in Belgium & 14 
locations in Finland). A total of 341 respondents (166 males, 175 females), 
50 from Finland and 291 from Belgium, participated in the study. The 
respondents had come to Belgium and Finland either as refugees or on 
other grounds after the 1994 genocide. The participants were selected 
according to the following criteria: They had to be above 20 years of age, 
they should be native Rwandans; they should speak the local language, 
Kinyarwanda, and have a residence permit. Participants filled in 
questionnaires and were also interviewed with open-ended questions. 
The data were collected during 13 months in the period of 
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1.8.2015−30.8.2016. The quantitative data were analysed with 
multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs). The findings are 
explained in four different articles presented in this dissertation, 
describing social suffering and healing among the Rwandan diaspora in 
Finland and Belgium. The respondents reported in the interviews that 
the consequences and aftermath of the Rwandan genocide led to severe 
personal and social trauma. Many Rwandans in Belgium and Finland 
have suffered the 1994 genocide against Tutsi; they have lost one or 
several members in their families: siblings, parents, wives, husbands, 
children, as well as neighbours, friends, and property. Some have family 
members still scattered in the refugee camps in African countries while 
others are in prisons. There are also a few respondents who have been 
imprisoned many years in Rwanda without any formal charges, and 
without any compensation. Because of these difficulties, some suffer 
from sleeping problems because they do not know how their beloved 
ones died, and they did not have time to bury them in dignity. In 
addition, some who are HIV/AIDS positive do not have hope for the 
future. In regard to counselling received, relatively few Rwandans were 
able to receive counselling from Belgian and Finnish psychologists, and 
likewise, few were able to receive governmental social benefits.  
Study I presents an analysis of the dual role of religion in regard to the 
genocide. Due to the fact that church administrations in Rwanda before 
the genocide, both Catholics and Protestants, favoured Tutsis, an ethnic 
division was created. Therefore, religious institutions unintentionally 
came to pave way for the genocide. On the other hand, after the 
genocide, religion has played an important role in the coping process. 
Study II is both a quantitative and a qualitative study, presenting data 
on the genocide experience of 40 Rwandans living in Finland. It was 
found that 57.5% of the respondents had lost one or more family member 
during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. In this sample, 72.5% 
reported being traumatised, and of these, 37.5% extremely traumatised. 
Fifty percent reported having sleeping problems often, and of these, 
22.5% very often. Seventy-five percent reported having bad dreams at 
least sometimes, 30% of these often, and 20% very often. Thirty percent 
of women and 5% of men reported having been raped. Of these, 15% of 
the women became pregnant due to the rape, and 10% were 
contaminated with HIV/AIDS. Ten percent of the respondents were born 
as a result of rape. Although 50% reported living peacefully with other 
Rwandans, 35% considered reconciliation difficult or extremely difficult. 
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In conclusion, the Rwandan diaspora living in Finland were severely 
traumatised by the genocide, and still, 22 years later, reconciliation 
appears difficult. 
Study III describes the trauma of women who had been raped during 
the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath, and of children who had been 
born as a result of rape during the genocide. In the Rwandan genocide 
against the Tutsi population, systematic sexual molestation, mutilation 
and rape of Tutsi women and girls were used as a tool to terrorize and 
annihilate the ethnic Tutsis. A questionnaire was completed by 341 
members of the Rwandan diaspora, over 20 years of age (166 males, 175 
females), who are living in Finland and Belgium. Of the women, 18 
(10.3%) had been exposed to rape, and 9 individuals (2.6%) were born as 
a result of rape. The findings indicate that the women who had been 
raped experienced a much more severe trauma than the children who 
were born as a result of rape.  
The objective of Study IV was to investigate coping strategies and the 
experience of mental health interventions in Rwandans traumatised by 
their experiences during the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, living in 
Belgium and Finland. It was based on the same questionnaire as Study 
III, completed by 341 Rwandans. The results showed that Rwandans in 
Belgium were more satisfied than those living in Finland with the 
therapeutic interventions, survivors’ group activities, and social support 
they had received in their host country. Rwandans in Finland, on the 
other hand, relied more on psychopharmaca and the use of alcohol as 
coping mechanisms than those living in Belgium.  
 
Keywords: Belgium, diaspora, Finland, genocide, healing, migrants, 
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1. Introduction 
The Rwandan people experienced a genocide directed against the Tutsi 
in 1994, which caused terrible bloodshed among men, women, and 
children. The genocide led to the exile of many Rwandan people and the 
establishment of diasporic communities in Africa, Europe, Australia, and 
North America. Many Rwandan people who reside both in Finland and 
Belgium after surviving the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, went 
through such tragedy that they still suffer from the social and 
psychological wounds that the ethnic violence and genocide have left 
them with. The study aims at studying social suffering experienced and 
expressed by the survivors of the Rwandan genocide who nowadays 
reside in the diaspora both in Finland and Belgium. More particular aims 
are to (a) provide an analysis of the role of the church before and after 
the genocide, (b) explore how frequent various forms of traumatic 
experiences during the genocide are among members of the diaspora in 
Finland, (c) compare the mental well-being of victims of rape during the 
genocide with the mental well-being of those who were born as a result 
of such rape, and (d) investigate coping methods and compare services 
aiming at trauma healing among genocide victims in Belgium and in 
Finland. 
One may ask, why study Rwandans in Finland and in Belgium? The 
choice of Finland is partly due to convenience, since the present author 
is living in Finland. However, the Rwandan community in Finland is 
relatively small and was to a large extent established only after the 
1994 genocide. On the other hand, the Rwandan community in 
Belgium is the largest in Europe, and it is of a considerably older age. 
Belgium was a Rwandan colonizer and there have been strong 
political, cultural, social, and economic ties between the Belgian people 
and the Rwandan regimes (1962-1994); Belgium was among Rwanda’s 
principal donors between the 1960 and 1994 (Schildt, 2013, pp. 24−25; 
Prunier, 1998, p. 33). Accordingly, it is of interest to compare the well-
being of the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium and Finland, and compare 
the effect of the psychological interventions they have received in the 
two countries.  
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1.1 Socio-historical Background of the Rwandan Conflict 
1.1.1 The Republic of Rwanda 
Rwanda is a small, hilly country in the Great Lakes region of Central 
Africa and it has a land area of 26,338 square kilometres. To Rwanda’s 
west lies one of Africa’s largest countries, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (formerly Zaïre), and to east is Tanzania. The country directly to 
the north is Uganda, while Burundi is located to the south. Rwanda 
contains many geographic features, such as volcanoes where the altitude 
rises to nearly five thousand meters above sea level and declines from 
west to east. Volcanoes located in the northwest of Rwanda and gorillas 
can be found at the slopes of the Kalisimbi and Nyiragongo. Rwanda has 
many lakes and rivers, and it also has been referred to as “the land of a 
thousand hills” and “the land of gorillas”. The climate of the country is 
particularly favourable for human occupation with an average annual 
temperature of 18°C and between 900 to 1600 mm of rainfall per year; 
with two rainy seasons and two dry seasons (Prunier, 1998, p. 2; 
Adekunle, 2007, p.1). 
 
Figure 1: Map of Rwanda 
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The main agricultural products are coffee and tea, but other products 
include beans, sorghum, maize, cassava, banana, cotton, peas and 
tobacco. Coffee and tea are Rwanda’s most important cash crops. They 
were first introduced into the country by the Belgian administration in 
the 1920s, and coffee cultivation was compulsory in many areas of 
Rwanda. The variety grown is mostly Arabica and it is considered on the 
world market to be of very good quality (Mamdani 2001, pp. 95−96). The 
mountainous areas in the country prevent communication, industrial 
development, and commercial encouragements. In these areas, 
infrastructure such as roads and railways are either lacking or inefficient. 
Rwanda’s population is young and predominantly rural. Christianity is 
the largest religion in the country. The country’s language Kinyarwanda 
is spoken by all Rwandans, while French and English serve as official 
languages, and Swahili as commercial language.  
In spite of having a long history as well as natural and physical 
beauty, not much has been written about Rwanda’s culture and customs 
(Adekunle 2007, p. ix; De Lame, 2005, pp. 3−4). Rwanda was, and still is, 
one of the poorest countries in the world due to a lack of important 
mineral resources, and it is the most densely populated country on the 
African continent. The capital Kigali has developed into the economic 
centre for Rwanda. Many cities like Butare, Kibuye, Gisenyi and 
Ruhengeli are experiencing modernity and Western influence. Rwanda is 
a land-locked country, which for its economy depends on a costly and 
vulnerable transit trade to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania, Uganda, 
or Kenya; and to the Atlantic Ocean through the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. The distance from Kigali to the Indian Ocean is approximately 
1500 kilometers, and 2000 kilometers to the Atlantic coastline. The 
majority of the Rwandan population lives on agriculture (Adekunle, 
2007, p. 1; Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 51; Hinga, Kubai, Mwaura, & 
Ayanga, 2008, p. 49; Luck, Brown, Humphries, & Adlington, 1999, p. 583; 
Kamukama, 1997, p. 1; Prunier, 1998, pp. 1–2; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 
1995, p. 7).  
According to the National Institute of Statistics, Rwanda is largely an 
agricultural country: 85.3% of the population lives in rural areas and 95% 
are substantially farmers (Republic of Rwanda, 2011, p. 22). In Rwanda, 
the literacy rate is extremely low (Republic of Rwanda 2005, pp. 46−47). 
In the 1994, Rwanda’s population of seven million was composed of 
three ethnic groups: Hutu (approximately 84%), Tutsi (15%) and Twa 
(1%) (Cook, 2006, p. 217; Kamukama, 1997, p. 1; Luck, 1999, p. 583; Union 
4 
Africaine, 2000, pp. 12–14). The Rwandan population was, in 2017, about 
12.5 million (Republic of Rwanda, 2017) However, the modern state of 
Rwanda does not contain all the areas over which its monarchs reigned 
in earlier times, while it also covers regions in which the king’s authority 
was at best nominal at the close of the nineteenth century. Rwanda was 
much bigger country before the 1885 conference of Berlin than it is today. 
Nowadays, Rwanda is known as the land of violence and the land of 
genocide. Therefore, after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda came into the focus 
of attention for the international society and world organizations.  
1.1.2 Rwanda in the Pre-colonial Period 
The contemporary nation of Rwanda, like other African nations, has its 
origins in the colonial divisions of Africa in the late nineteenth century, 
but it had an antecedent in the pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda, which 
included much of the territory now contained within the boundaries of 
the modern state. According to some researchers, the Kingdom of 
Rwanda began expanding from a main kingdom in the central Rwandan 
region known as Nduga in about the sixteenth or seventeenth century, 
bringing neighbouring kingdoms and regions under varying degrees of 
control through conquests or alliances (Dorsey, 1994, pp. 6–7; 
Kamukama, 1997, pp. 9–10; Longman, 2010, p. 34).  
Most historians, geographers, and anthropologists agree that Rwanda 
was probably originally occupied by Twa hunter-gatherers and forest-
dwellers, who have inhabited the country from as early as 2,000 B.C, but 
today form only a small minority in the country. For centuries, they were 
erroneously and offensively categorized as ‘pygmies’ and relegated to be 
a marginalized people in the Rwandan society (Dorsey, 1994, p. 6; 
Kamukama, 1997, p. 8; Malkki, 1995, p. 21). Around 1,000 A D, a 
migration of farmers began to settle and displaced Twa by cutting down 
trees and cultivating. This migration was part of the so-called Bantu 
expansion, which, in the case of Rwanda, can be followed from the 
savannahs of present Cameroon or Chad, to the Great Lakes region. They 
wore goat and lambskins and bark cloths and organized themselves into 
lineages and clans under the leadership of heads or chiefs respectively. 
Hutu co-existed with Twa, and traded skins and meat in exchange for 
salt and iron goods (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 36–37; Kamukama, 1997, p. 8; 
Malkki, 1995, p. 21; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 10; Straus 2006, 
pp. 17–19). By the 15th century, the Hutus were organised into small 
“states”. Each of these states was controlled by a dominant clan (a social 
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category whose members acknowledge descent from a common 
ancestor), composed of several different lineages under a ruling lineage 
headed by a king (umuhinza), who was a land chief as well as a ritual 
leader in charge of rain-making. Later, in 15th century, Tutsis cattle-
herders migrated from the North, and east from Karagwe to this fertile 
area, well-watered by the many lakes and rivers that cut through its 
valleys and hills. They began to dominate the other tribes by controlling 
the use and distribution of cattle, forcing the Hutu cultivators to 
exchange agricultural products in return for the use of their cattle and 
protection against raids (Kamukama, 1997, p. 8; Luck et al., 1999, p. 583; 
Malkki, 1995, pp. 22–23; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 10; Tutu, 
1994, p. 2). However, there is a theory that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
constituted -classes within a clan. They argued that all three ethnic 
groups are mixtures derived from the same clan, which is a common 
denominator that unites many different lineages who do not necessarily 
know each other (Gatwa, 2005, p. 10; Kamukama, 1997, p. 9; Malkki, 
1995, p. 24). This led some of them into building up coercive and 
ideological machineries, culminating in the emergence of broader 
political entities which were like kingdoms. When the Tutsis entered 
Rwanda, both the Hutus and the Twa had settled in clearly defined 
areas. There were small, effective, independent kingdoms within what is 
called Rwanda today, such as Bukunzi and Busoga in the south and 
Kibari, Bushiru, and Buhoma in the north (Desforges, 1999, pp. 31–32; 
Kamukama, 1997, pp.6–7; Longman, 2010, pp. 34–34). Nevertheless, 
peaceful co-existence was usually followed by the Tutsi conquest, 
resulting in the establishment of a direct Tutsi military rule and 
administration.  
The further expansion of Rwanda’s boundaries occurred after the 
accession of King Ruganzu Ndori to power in the 17th century; a series of 
invasions were launched against formerly independent Hutu areas in the 
west and north (Dorsey, 1994, pp. 6–7; Kamukama 1997, pp. 9–10). By the 
late 18th century, Rwanda and Burundi formed a single Tutsi dominated 
state, ruled by a king (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 3–5; Dorsey, 1994, 
pp. 6–7; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 8−9; Luck, et. al., 1999, p. 583; Tutu, 1994, 
p. 2). In the 18th century, cultivators and pastoralists lived intermixed in 
most areas, although the cool, wet highlands of the north had few 
pastoralists and the drier, hotter east had more. With fertile soil and 
regular rainfall, the region was productive, and population grew to a 
point where Rwanda was in 1994 the most densely populated nation on 
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the African continent. Cultivators skilled in making war and able to 
mobilize large groups of followers rose to importance through the 
military system, particularly under the late nineteenth century Rwandan 
monarchy of Kigeri IV Rwabugiri, who brought Rwanda to the height of 
its power. In its drive to expand, Rwanda attacked neighbouring people 
regardless of whether they were pastoralists or cultivators, and 
regardless of whether they were organised in lineages or in states 
(Desforges, 1999, pp. 31–32; Longman, 2010, p. 34). By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the king administered the central region closely 
through multiple hierarchies of competing officials who ruled men, 
cattle, pasturage, and agricultural land. As the Rwandan state grew in 
strength, the ruling elite became more clearly defined and its members, 
like powerful people in most societies, began to think of themselves as 
superior to ordinary people. However, even though the terms Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa existed, the children of Hutu who became sufficiently 
powerful would be considered as Tutsi and could marry Tutsi women, 
while Tutsi families that lost power finally would became Hutu 
(Destexhe, 1995, pp. 36–37; Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 145–154; Longman, 
2010, pp. 34–35). 
Furthermore, apart from the Rwandan mode of production, the 
Rwandan people share a common heritage with a number of shared 
cultural aspects; the only distinction is their mode of life - one group is 
agriculturalist while the other is pastoralist - and both had lived side by 
side, each with a role to play for the other. In practice, when the Tutsi 
arrived in Rwanda, they were integrated by the Hutu. Tutsi learned the 
language spoken by Hutu (Kinyarwanda) and incorporated their 
traditional-cultural practice and myths; and they had the same religion 
(Bangamwabo, Maniragaba, Munyantwali, Nduwayezu, Nyagahene, 
Rukiramakuba, Rumiya, & Uwizeyimana, 1991, pp. 94–96; De Lame, 
2005, pp. 99–100; Dorsey, 1994, p. 6; Gatwa, 2005, p. 10; Kamukama, 1997, 
p. 6; Sebasoni, 2000, p. 31; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 9–10; 
Tutu, 1994, pp. 2–3). However, cattle were the dominant form of wealth, 
also giving the Tutsis greater power (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 51; 
Tutu, 1994, p. 3; Sebasoni, 2000, pp. 22–23).  
The Tutsis developed the sacred political institutions of the King and 
used the royal drum (Kalinga) as a symbol for the unity for the Rwandan 
kingdom. In a well-organized and stratified culture, the power was held 
by the Tutsi kings and chiefs, and this was also clearly identifiable in 
Hutu areas (De Lame, 2005, pp. 99–100; Tutu, 1994, p. 3). To demonstrate 
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his supremacy, the King controlled and distributed land. There were 
three types of chiefs who assisted and advised the king in performing his 
political duties: the military chief, whose responsibility was to defend 
and expand the kingdom; the cattle chief, who was in charge of grazing 
and settling disputes; and the land chief who administered agricultural 
land and harvest (Adekunle, 2007, p. 5; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 68−69). Apart 
from chiefs, there were abiru (royal traditional religious people), who 
performed complex religious rituals in order to consolidate the king’s 
power. The ubwiru was a council of religious hereditary experts 
established presumably by the first king, not only to perform regular 
rituals but also to serve as religious and political advisors to the king. 
Like other chiefs, abiru owned land as a source of revenue, and Hutu 
could work for them without expecting any pay (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 63–
64).  
In conclusion, the identification of Tutsi pastoralists as power-holders 
and of Hutu cultivators as subordinates was becoming common before 
the arrival of the Europeans in Rwanda at the turn of the 18th century, but 
it was not yet completely fixed throughout the country (Desforges, 1999, 
p. 33; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 37–41). A number of studies have shown that 
even though the terms “Hutu, Tutsi and Twa” existed in the pre-colonial 
period, they did not have the same implication as later. In the late 1800s, 
chiefs began to require Hutu to engage in uburetwa, a form of forced 
labour, which added to the ethnic distinction and contributed to tensions 
between the groups. This process of ethnic differentiation continued 
under colonial rule (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 140–147; Longman, 2010, 
p. 36; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 65−66; Straus, 2006, pp. 20–21). The description 
of Rwandan ethnic groups was partly based on indigenous mythology, 
which was supported and diffused by outsiders; and it came to represent 
the generalized western view of the Rwandan people. 
1.1.3 Rwanda during the Colonial Period 
During the divisions of Africa among the European powers in Berlin 
1884, Rwanda was accredited to be a German colony from 1889 to 1918. It 
became a Belgian colony in 1918 (after WW1), until it received 
independence on July 1, 1962 (De Lame, 2005, pp. 57–59; Destexhe, 1995, 
p. 38; Luck, 1999, p. 583; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 9; Union 
African, 2000, pp. 12–14; Uvin, 1998, p. 16). Before the arrival of the 
Europeans in 1895, the people of Rwanda had been organized and lived 
together, and Rwanda was a highly controlled and hierarchical country. 
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The structure was based on divisions between province, district, hill, and 
neighbourhood levels. When the Germans colonizers arrived in Rwanda, 
they followed a policy of indirect rule and allowed Rwanda’s monarchy 
to continue; and they also identified the royal Tutsis as their favourites, 
exploiting the pre-colonial structures. German colonial rule continued 
the Tutsi dominance and reinforced the position of power of the Tutsis. 
In colonial times in Africa, the colonisers could not bring enough of their 
own citizens to the colonies; instead they chose certain Africans tribes to 
lead their fellow Africans. Blessed by the German colonists, Tutsi chiefs 
began to demand that Hutus to work for them and pay tributes in 
physical labour, farm products, and personal loyalty to Tutsi chiefs 
without expecting anything in return (Destexhe, 1995, p. 39; Dorsey, 
1994, p. 14; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, p. 170; Prunier, 1998, p. 27). In 
addition, through the custom of “Ubuhake “(the right to own cattle), 
which transferred from father to son, Tutsi domination was effectively 
assured. The king was the owner of all cattle which he distributed to 
individuals who could in turn pass them on to others. Power was in the 
hands of the Tutsi pastoralists, and hard labour was forced upon the 
Hutu agriculturalists and Twa hunters (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 39–40; 
Longman, 2010, pp. 36–37). When the Germans arrived in 1895, the king, 
Yuhi V Musinga, had only recently succeeded to the throne, and the 
advances made by the king’s son Rwabugiri to extend the power of the 
royal court were under challenge. Later, the German colonizers helped 
the king to centralize the political power; they established the borders of 
the Rwandan kingdom, and they supported efforts by the court to bring 
all areas within those boundaries under the control of the king. They 
assisted the Rwandan monarchy in calming independent Hutu 
kingdoms, especially in the North, that had existed until the beginning of 
Musinga’s reign (Destexhe, 1995, p. 40; Longoman, 2010, pp. 38–40). 
With Belgian trusteeship under the League of Nations after the 1st 
world war, the position of the Tutsis as the ruling elite was gradually 
institutionalized by giving them educational advantages and 
administrative positions. Hutus were systematically excluded from all 
levels of power and left in a subordinated position (Bangamwabo et al., 
1991, pp. 78–80; Dallaire, 2003, p. 47; De Lame, 2005, pp. 101–102; 
Kamukama, 1997, pp. 20–22; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 3–5; 
Tutu, 1994, p.3; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18).  
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Figure 2. The Belgians distinguished between Hutus and Tutsis by nose size, 
height, and eye type. Another classification of Hutu farmers from Tutsi 
pastoralists was the number of cows owned. Photograph from Au plus profond 
de l’Afrique Le Rwanda et la colonization Allemande 1885-1919, by Gudrun 
Honke, open access at the internet. 
For the Belgians, despite the fact that Hutus and Tutsi had intermarried 
for centuries, the Tutsi were tall and gracious people with smaller noses; 
people who in the eyes of the Belgians conducted themselves well, kept 
cattle and had an understanding of monarchical institutions. The Belgian 
period was characterised by ethnical conflict. Identity cards were 
introduced in the1930s to identify Rwandan ethnic groups.  
This designation could not be changed except by paying an enormous 
bribe (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 63; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 40–41; Tutu, 
1994, p. 5; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18). Due to the fact that intermarriages 
were common in certain parts of Rwanda, it was impossible to divide 
many Rwandans into certain groups on the basis of their physical 
features alone. Wealth could also be a decisive factor in gaining an 
identity card; people who had a lot of money or many cows were often 
able to obtain a Tutsi card. The cards caused discrimination against the 
Hutu population in all aspects of daily life, which forced many Hutu to 
flee the country to neighbouring ones (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 
29). Education, employment, and economic opportunities were reserved 
for Tutsis, producing a huge gap between the ethnic groups, which was 
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at the root of the Hutu anger and resentment that inspired the 1959 
uprising (Bartov & Mack, 2001, p. 146; Prunier, 1998, pp. 32–33).  
According to some studies, the German and Belgian colonisers 
blamed the imbalance in the schools for the low social standing of the 
Hutu; they also played a crucial role in creating an ethnic split and 
ensured that the feeling of belonging to a social group was driven by 
ethnic and racial hatred (Cook, 2006, pp. 163–164; Lemarchand, 1970, p. 
145; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18). Moreover, by controlling all educational 
facilities in Rwanda, the Roman Catholic Church ensured that at least 
some Tutsis had enough education and abilities to become 
administrators and encouraged them to treat the Hutus as inferior 
(Sandström, 2005, p. 49; Tutu, 1994, p. 4). Furthermore, missionaries and 
colonizers even developed a theory that Tutsis were Hamitic people who 
may have been Christianised in Ethiopia, making them more open to re-
evangelization and genetically and intellectually superior to Hutus (De 
Lame, 2005, p. 102; Kamukama, 1997, p. 20; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 
1995, pp. 10–11; Tutu, 1994, p.2). After the conversion of the King Mutara 
Rudahigwa to Christianity in 1931, even the Roman Catholic Church 
identified with the Tutsi leadership. Hutus were often oppressed into 
forced labour, a kind of slavery that was legally abolished in 1927 
(Kamukama, 1997, p. 26; Tutu, 1994, p. 3; Uvin, 1998, pp. 16–18). In 
addition, the Hutus were subjected to both monarchical and colonial 
exploitation and oppression (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 52; Dallaire 
2003, p. 47; Destexhe, 1995, p. 39; Gatwa, 2005, pp. 30–31; Kamukama, 
1997, p. 25; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 11). Moreover, many 
researchers argue that, from the beginning, the Catholic Church enjoyed 
a warm relationship with the Belgian colonizers and the Tutsi royal 
court, quickly becoming the second most powerful institution in the 
country. A few small Protestant missions of the Reformed and Anglican 
traditions were established late in the 19th century by missionaries from 
Belgium, Britain, Denmark, and Switzerland (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 
142–146; Patte, 2010, p. 1116; Tutu, 1994, p. 4).  
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2. Rwanda during the Post-colonial Period: 
Republics 
2.1 The First Rwandan Republic 
The few Hutu who joined formal education found an opportunity for 
enlightenment and advancement. Education gave rise to an elite middle 
class among the oppressed (Bangamwabo et al. 1991, p. 139–144; 
Kamukama, 1997, p. 25). The Belgian strategy of segregation caused 
conflict and led to civil war. Between 1952 and 1959, when the Belgian 
political reforms threatened the intermediary position of the Tutsi 
oligarchy and provided some limited autonomous political space to the 
Hutu, which challenged the privileged position of the Tutsi, political 
violence between the Tutsi and the Hutu escalated (Lemarchand, 1970, 
pp. 145–154; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 11). On March 24, 1957, 
Gregoire Kayibanda who had been secretary to the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop André Perraudin and editor of a Catholic newspaper 
“Kinyamateka” created the Hutu social movement Partie du Mouvement 
de l’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU). This movement demanded the 
abolition of class privileges, access to all jobs, schooling for all classes, 
and freedom of expression (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 151–152; 
Kamukama, 1997, pp. 28–29; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 12; Tutu, 
1994, pp. 4–5).  
However, Tutsis also formed their own party Union National 
Rwandais (UNAR), which was militant, pro-monarchy, and anti-Belgian 
colonizers. There were conflicts between UNAR and PARMEHUTU. 
According to some scholars, the spark which ignited the revolution was 
very small. A Hutu sub-chief and PARMEHUTU activist, Dominique 
Mbonyumutwa, was walking home in Gitarama on November 1, 1959. 
He was attacked by young members of the Tutsi party UNAR, and he 
was harshly beaten. In retaliation, the Hutus attacked a notable Tutsi 
chief, and many Tutsis’ houses were burnt without making any 
distinctions between high-lineage and ordinary Tutsi (Kamukama, 1997, 
p. 31; Prunier, 1998, pp. 48–49). During that incident, the Belgian 
authorities supported the Hutus fully and even allowed them to burn 
Tutsi houses without any intervention. On November 28, 1959, there was 
a Hutu revolution reacting to the exclusive rule exercised by the Tutsi 
clan leader (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 5; Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 
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165–168; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 28–31; Lemarchand, 1970, p. 145; 
Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 11; Tutu, 1994, p. 4).  
The Hutu leaders insisted on fundamental change, and the Tutsi 
leaders resisted. There was tension and then violence, initially against the 
Tutsi chiefs and then progressively against the wider Tutsi population 
(Kamukama, 1997, p. 31; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, p. 175). With the 
coloniser’s support, more than half of the Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs 
were replaced by Hutus within the space of a few months (Kinloch & 
Mohan, 2005, p. 175; Mann, 2005, p. 434; Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, 
p. 13). In addition, king Kigeli V Rwabugiri was overthrown and fled the 
country. The Hutu revolution took 20,000 lives and led 300,000 Tutsis to 
flee to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the DRC (Zaïre) [Kamukama, 
1997, pp. 32–33; Malkki, 1995, pp. 30–31; Prunier, 1998, pp. 61–62; Tutu, 
1994, p. 5]. On October 26, 1961 Gregoire Kayibanda became president. 
However, the UN trusteeship status was formally terminated, and 
independence was granted on July 1, 1962 (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 
5–7; Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 165–168; Kamukama, 1997, pp. 31–33; 
Prunier, 1998, p. 54; Union Africaine, 2000, pp. 17–20).  
Rwanda became a Hutu nation, and Tutsis were marginalised and 
excluded from key positions. In addition, southerners were also regarded 
as too infected by the Tutsis to be trusted in a truly Hutu nation 
(Bangamwabo et al., 1991, p. 62; Malkki, 1995, pp. 30–31; Straus, 2006, p. 
23; Tutu, 1994, p. 6). Two major political trends dominated post-
independence Rwanda. First, the principles of the Hutu Revolution 
guided official policy, which meant that Hutu dominated the 
government and military, often to the exclusion of Tutsi. Grégoire 
Kayibanda discriminated the Tutsi even more than his successor. Under 
his leadership, there was a series of anti-Tutsi massacres in the early 
1960s and in 1973. Second, regionalism shaped significant political 
conflict among Hutus. Kayibanda came from the Gitarama Prefecture in 
the south-central region of the country. His rule tended to favour Hutus 
in central and southern regions (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 44–45; Strauss, 2006, 
p. 23). The ethnic hate campaign continued after independence. The 
Hutu government’s anti-Tutsi policies evoked militant response from the 
Tutsi who had become refugees in neighbouring Uganda and Burundi 
during the 1959 Hutu Revolution. The militants among these refugees 
mounted a series of attacks against the southern part of Rwanda between 
1961 and 1967, which earned them the demeaning name of Inyenzi 
(cockroaches). The attacks were perceived by Hutus as an attempt to 
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overthrow their republic and return Rwanda to a Tutsi-led monarchy. 
This sparked conflicts and hate between Hutus and those Tutsis who has 
chosen to stay in Rwanda (Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 173–174; Kinloch 
& Mohan, 2005, pp. 176–177; Prunier, 1998, pp. 54–55; Adelman & 
Suhrke, 1999, p. 62).  
However, most of the prominent Tutsi leaders of the UNAR and 
Ressemblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER) who had opted to 
stay in Rwanda were executed on suspicion that they sympathised with 
Inyenzi attackers. In addition, the attacks led to massive revenge killings 
of innocent Tutsi and forced them to flee the country. Since the Tutsi 
attacks, the Kayibanda government faced much criticism. The critique 
focused on government policy in education and employment. Some 
claimed that the government was not doing enough to advance Hutu 
representation in civic society. The critique first came from unemployed 
Hutu school graduates. Many Hutus had left primary school for lack of 
resources, and were ploughing urban streets looking for employment 
(Longman, 2010, pp. 84–85; Mamdani, 2001, p. 135). Furthermore, even 
though Hutus formed the majority in schools, university enrolment in 
the middle and late 1960s was nearly 90 percent Tutsi. This was so in 
spite of a government policy restricting Tutsi enrolment in 
postsecondary institutions to be between 10 and 20 percent of the overall 
figure. By the early 1970s, about half the teachers and about half of the 
students in secondary schools and in higher education were still Tutsi. 
Tutsis were also particularly successful in the private sector (businesses). 
The critique no doubt put great pressure on the government to take 
control of the educational system that was mainly under Church control 
(Mamdani, 2001, p. 135–135; Strauss, 2006, p. 189–190).  
The 1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda had an impact on Burundi, 
forcing Burundians to pay no attention to the intragroup divisions that 
had moderated ethnic clash during the colonial period. Instead, they 
started to define their interests increasingly in ethnic terms. Tutsi 
refugees from Rwanda played a radicalising role in Burundi, warning 
Burundi’s Tutsis of the danger of giving power to Hutus, while the 
Burundian Hutus were inspired by the happenings in Rwanda to request 
greater political power. After an uprising in 1965 by Hutu army officers, 
hundreds of Hutus were killed, and Hutus were expelled from the army 
and government. After Burundian king Rwagasore, who had acted as a 
moderating force on ethnic issues, died in 1966, the son who became king 
was unable to maintain Burundian unity, and in November 1966, a 
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group of Tutsi army officers took power under the leadership of the new 
president Michel Micombero, a member of the lower status Hima group 
of Tutsi, who had historically been excluded from power (Lemarchand, 
1970, pp. 59–75; Longman 2010, pp. 84–85).  
In order to avoid a Rwandan-model revolution, Burundi’s new 
leaders excluded all Hutus from any position that might offer them a 
platform for rebellion. After an attack in May 1972 on southern Burundi 
by a group of rebels supported by Mulelist Congolese rebels, the 
Burundian military responded by systematically slaughtering as many as 
200,000 Hutu, targeting in particular intellectuals, professionals, and any 
others perceived by the military as holding the potential to organise 
rebellion (Longman, 2010, p. 84; Mamdani, 2001, p. 137). The massacre 
led to a Hutu refugee influx into Rwanda and to anger and insecurity, 
particularly among Rwandan Hutu elites. Unlike Rwanda, Burundi did 
not undergo an ethnic reversal of power at independence. Rather, Tutsi 
from a particular region dominated the government, the military and the 
economy. In January 1973, violence began in Rwanda against Tutsi 
because of their fellow Hutu-Burundian’s situation (Cook, 2006, p. 219; 
Mamdani, 2001, p. 137; Strauss, 2006, p. 189).  
The violence began in the secondary schools, the national university, 
public offices, and state companies. The goals were purely to order Tutsis 
to leave the institutions to which they were attached either as students or 
workers. However, the violence did not initially involve killing but 
rather removing: Hutu students descended on secondary schools, 
teaching colleges, and the national university with a list of Tutsi students 
to expel. In some circumstances, party and government officials assisted 
the students publically. The attacks forced out large numbers of Tutsis 
from secondary schools and from the university. The violence then 
spread to the public and private sectors. Notices were posted, declaring 
that such and such persons on the lists were no longer allowed to set foot 
in a particular institution in Rwanda. Surprisingly, subsequent eruptions 
of violence went beyond the ethnic divide when the natives of the south 
and centre of the country became the next victims (Gatwa, 2005, p. 122; 
Mamdani, 2001, p. 136–137; Strauss, 2006, p. 189). Among those targeted 
were children of mixed marriages, who were accused of having changed 
their ethnic affiliation. The threat was enough to get the bulk of the two 
hundred Tutsis students at the university to leave. Soon lists began to 
proliferate at places of employment-banks, private businesses, and even 
at an embassy. Once again many of the named Tutsi employees left. 
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Radio Rwanda was used to broadcast appeals inciting the Hutu to rise 
up and avenge against Tutsis. The agitation expanded in concentric 
circles. Just as it had begun in the educational institutions and moved 
into ministries and enterprises, it grew by a ripple effect, with each ripple 
bringing into the fold yet another tension both within power and within 
society. In the speedily exacerbated situation, a number of Tutsis were 
murdered, and many others fled the country to neighbouring ones 
(Cook, 2006, p. 283; Longman, 2010, p. 85; Mamdani, 2001, p. 137; Union 
Africaine, 2000, pp. 17–20).  
The army used this ethnic violence as a pretext to make a coup in 1973 
against the regime of Grégoire Kayibanda. On July 5, 1973, Rwandan 
military officers, primarily from the northwest region (Gisenyi) 
performed a coup led by thirty-six-year-old Juvenal Habyarimana. The 
officers’ stated objectives were to end ethnic division, regional 
favouritism, and to restore national unity. Still, Tutsis who had been 
chased from their posts were not allowed to return to their previous 
positions (Cook, 2006, p. 219; Mamdani, 2001, p. 138; Strauss, 2006, p. 
190-191). Kayibanda was arrested and died under house arrest in 1976. 
His key assistants were imprisoned in Ruhengeri in the northern part of 
the country. According to some authors, the terrible conditions under 
which they were killed were similar to those of the horrific massacres of 
1994. Some were buried alive; others put in bags and beaten to death; 
and some were tied to the bonnets of speeding cars on the roads between 
Ruhengeri and Gisenyi (Gatwa, 2005, p. 122–123; Strauss, 2006, pp. 190–
191).  
2.2 The Second Rwandan Republic 
Taking advantage of the government’s inability to meet these challenges, 
the army Chief of Staff, Juvenal Habyarimana, moved on in July 5, 1973, 
to sack President Kayibanda, and installed himself as president. In his 
installation speech, Habyarimana said that ethnic problems constituted 
the reason for his coup d’état. He mentioned that the First Republic had 
not fully implemented the objectives of the 1959 revolution. In addition, 
Habyarimana criticised the First Republic for not advancing Hutu 
representation in education and in civil society in general (in the First 
Republic, 90% of the university students were Tutsi), and in government 
employment in particular (Cook, 2006, p. 21; Longman, 2010, pp. 83–86; 
Mamdani, 2001, p. 136). Furthermore, the inaction of the Kayibanda 
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regime, the agitation in the whole country, and the power struggle 
between Hutu from the North and Hutu from the South prompted 
Habyarimana to take power (Gatwa, 2005, pp. 122–123; Longman, 2010, 
pp. 83–86; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 136–138). Habyarimana moved quickly to 
bring order to the country by banning political activities for two years, 
and to mitigate the causes of the most recent round of ethnic violence, by 
establishing ethnic quotas for education and employment. He 
reorganised the state administrative apparatus, centralising political 
authority and strengthening state capacities, and in 1975, like Kayibanda, 
Habyarimana established a single political party dictatorship, le 
Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (National 
Revolutionary Movement for Development, MRND), to help maintain 
order, ensure support for the regime, and organise popular participation 
in economic development. The single party stuck with its extremist 
policy which was used as basis for the distribution of resources and 
opportunities. However, president Habyarimana continued the 
discriminatory policies of the past government toward the Tutsis in land 
redistribution, education, and employment opportunities. He was a 
regionalist and directed foreign assistance into his home region. The 
south became a hotbed of oppositional forces represented by both Tutsis 
and disaffected Hutus (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 72–74; Destexhe, 
1995, p. 45; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, p. 177; Longman, 2010, p. 88; Prunier 
1998, p. 76).  
From 1973 to the late 1980s, the Habyarimana regime had enjoyed 
strong popularity; the regime presided over a period of economic 
growth, infrastructure improvement, diplomatic openings, inter-national 
support, and general economic and political stability. It had attracted 
extensive international development investment and had effectively 
managed the unstable ethnic situation. Foreigners regarded the regime as 
a model in a troubled area. There were regional and economic 
inequalities and cleavages, but ethnic divisions narrowed in 
Habyarimana’s presidency. He also kept the Tutsi presence in 
government and education, but to a minimum level (Bartov & Mack, 
2001, pp. 150–151; Cook, 2006, pp. 8–10; Destexhe, 1995; p. 45; Longman, 
2010, pp. 88-89; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 138–141; Straus, 2006, p. 192). By 
1987, Rwanda had the lowest debt, the lowest inflation rate, and the 
highest rate of growth of the gross national product (GNP) of any 
country in the region. The share of primary activities, mainly subsistence 
agriculture, in the GNP had declined from 80 percent in 1962 to 48 
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percent in 1986. At the same time, secondary activities had risen from 8 
percent to 21 percent, and services from 12 percent to 31 percent. The rate 
of mortality was down. Hygiene and medical care indicators were 
improving. The proportion of children in school had gone up from 49.5 
percent in 1978 to 61.5 percent 1986. There had been no political 
executions since 1982, and there were fewer political prisoners than in 
most African countries. The record was impressive in three sectors: 
agriculture, reforestation, and infra-structure (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 144–
145).  
The second republic followed a national goal and sought to arrive at a 
balance between two tension-ridden objectives: justice and reconciliation. 
Reconciliation with the Tutsi was to be in a context of justice for the 
Hutu. The model of such justice was to be through a system of balance 
within previous Tutsi-dominated institutions, particularly the church, 
education, and employment (Longman, 2010, p. 88; Mamdani, 2001, p. 
138). With his presidency, Habyarimana also shifted the power base from 
Gitarama, the home region of the deposed President Kayibanda, to his 
home region of the northwest. This shift in power to the northern Hutu 
alienated those in the south (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 44–45; Prunier, 1998, p. 
61). Despite the apparent period of appeasement, the ethnic question 
remained very much alive. Fear was the radicalising element in the 
conflict, each ethnic group was guarding the memories of the members 
who were killed in ethnic clashes. The President Habyarimana forced all 
citizens at age of 18 to pay a MRND membership fee. The membership 
was compulsory, and the MRND party could oversee the local 
implementation of national government programs, such as animation, 
ritualized expressions of support and loyalty to the regime, and 
umuganda, a program of weekly community service, such as planting 
trees, building bridges, and repairing roads (Longman, 2010, pp. 88–91; 
Strauss, 2006, pp. 191–192).  
In the mid-1980s, however, the Rwandan population was discontent 
with the regime, due to the high level of official corruption and the 
luxury lifestyle of state officials. A collapse in the price of coffee, which 
was Rwanda’s main export that financed the government, seriously 
affected both small farmers and the middle class (Adelman & Suhrke, 
1999, p. 66; Strauss, 2006, pp. 191–192). As the central African 
governments came under pressure to allow democracy and personal 
freedom; the Habyariman regime stood out, and many Rwandan people 
began to object increasingly to the required MRND membership, 
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communal labour, and loyalty rituals. Hutu from the south and central of 
the country and Tutsi opposed to the control of the political system held 
by Hutu from Habyarimana’s home region (Gisenyi) in the north. In 
1989, an explosion of new publications appeared in Rwanda after the 
oldest paper in the country, the catholic biweekly Kinyamateka, began to 
ignore censorship rules and published open accounts about corruption 
and the country’s economic problems. Various groups that had begun to 
emerge in the 1980s outside the umbrella of the MRND, such as women’s 
groups, youth associations, and informal associations of intellectuals, 
became increasingly politicised and began to demand Habyarimana to 
implement democratic reforms. The democratic movements in Rwanda 
gained momentum after the national conferences in Benin and Congo in 
February 1990 replaced authoritarian rules in those countries (Bartov & 
Mack, 2001, pp. 150–151; Longman, 2010, pp. 88−91; Strauss, 2006, pp. 
191–192).  
Feeling gradually more pressure on him, Habyarimana announced in 
July 1990 that he would allow a free debate on the country’s future and 
would begin to implement reforms. Being assured that Habyarimana 
was sufficiently vulnerable to be easily driven from power by a rebel 
army based in Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was 
composed primarily of Tutsi refugees from the ethnic violence of the 
1959, 1963, and the 1970s, invaded Rwanda in October 1990; this added 
further pressure on the regime, but it also provided Habyarimana with a 
justification for cracking down on his critics. Some church leaders and 
institutions like the newspaper Kinyamateka supported the democracy 
movement, and the Catholic hierarchy published pastoral letters in 
February and May which in vague terms denounced corruption and 
called for expanded respect for human rights (Bartov & Mack, 2001, pp. 
150–151). Although Habyarimana ended the ethnic violence against 
Tutsis in 1973, the policy continued to operate on a measure system 
according to the population size of each tribe. The MRND also possessed 
a very strong intelligence system which it used to further the interests of 
the Habyarimana regime. By the end of his rule, Habyarimana’s regional 
and later family politics led to his almost total reliance on kinsmen from 
the northern region to perpetuate himself in power. Determined to 
maintain their power, they are believed to have eliminated rival allies 
such as Colonel Stanislas Mayuya in 1988, and critical opponents such as 
journalist Father Silvio Sindambiwe, and a member of the opposition in 
Parliament from Butare, Félecula Nyiramutarambirwa. This explains 
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why the first victims of Hutu extremist genocide in 1994 were mostly 
from the central and southern regions of Rwanda (Adelman & Suhrke, 
1999, p. 65; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 141–142). By the time of the RPF invasion 
of Rwanda, the central command in the country had been shaken. The 
Habyarimana regime, which had entrenched itself politically through its 
party, the MRND, found out that it was not only being challenged by the 
military invasion of the RPA, but also by opposition from newly formed 
political parties, journalists, the international community, and other 
organizations of groups or individuals (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, pp. 64–
65). In the attempt to fortify their previous unchallenged social, political, 
and economic position, the seeds of the extremism sown in the colonial 
period in the ethnicisation of politics were now growing in the narrow-
minded regional clans that saw all outsiders as threats to their monopoly 
on power.  
Political liberalization swept Africa in the late 1980s, including 
Rwanda. This generated hope among elements in the Tutsi diaspora that 
they could negotiate their return to Rwanda. However, the Habyarimana 
government refused to accept a peaceful resolution of the status of 
expatriate Tutsi refugees (Cook, 2006, p. 219; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 45–46). 
The 1986 National Resistance Movement (NRM) takeover in Uganda was 
to have important political implications for Rwanda: Most of the young 
men and women who participated in the Uganda guerrilla war were 
Rwandese refugees living in Uganda. Some of them acquired very high 
ranks and positions in both the government and the Ugandan army. This 
was one of the first shock wave messages to the regime of Habyarimana. 
For the first time, he saw in these young soldiers in Uganda a possible 
formidable opposition force against him. This was perhaps an 
explanation why on July 27, 1987, the Central Committee of the MRND 
issued a declaration announcing that it would not allow the immigration 
of large numbers of Rwandan refugees, offering the excuse that the 
country’s economy and the Rwandan soil were incapable of sustaining 
increased numbers. The announcement was made at this time because 
the Habyarimana regime feared that Rwandan refugees would want to 
return home and that the Rwandan refugee group in Uganda would be 
the first group to return. When president Habyarimana visited Uganda 
in February 1988 to discuss the problem of refugees with his colleague 
president Joel Museveni, this brought the problem his regime was facing 
much closer. In addition to the refugee problem, political tension was 
increasingly mounting within the country as well. The economic crisis 
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facing the country, to which the president personally admitted on June 
16, 1987, by appointing a management committee for the crisis, added to 
the pressure on the regime. Coffee prices collapsed in 1986 due to bad 
weather, and the country suffered food shortages. The World Bank and 
IMF were forcing a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on Rwanda, 
and severe aid cuttings were also made by his supporters. At the same 
time, a few incidents in the early 1990s demonstrated the increasing 
political tension as well as the boldness of the opposition. There were 
signed petitions by intellectuals in August 1990, calling for a movement 
for democratic reform (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 66; Destexhe, 1995, p. 
45; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 146–148).  
The French president François Mitterand called on African countries 
to open up to the democratic process during a conference in La Baule in 
summer 1990, showing that he was ready to put pressure on 
francophone African countries in order to achieve democracy. 
Meanwhile, the Tutsi diaspora in neighbouring countries had begun to 
organize themselves to return by force. In Uganda, a Tutsi group formed 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that gave considerable support to 
President Museveni in his struggle for power. Many Hutus regarded the 
group as the descending from the Tutsi aristocracy that had fled Rwanda 
in 1959, as many of them had been born outside the country. They had 
little or no personal knowledge of Rwanda, and they spoke English 
rather than French. They claimed, however, that they also were Rwandan 
citizens and demanded the right to return home (Destexhe, 1995, pp. 45–
46). On October 1, 1990, the Tutsis attacked northern Rwanda from their 
Ugandan base. Banding themselves into a military outfit, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front was led by Major Fred Rwigema, with the express 
purpose of power-sharing with President Habyarimana (Adelman & 
Suhrke, 1999, 73–74; Bangamwabo et al., 1991, pp. 209–210; Cook, 2006, p. 
217; Dallaire, 2003, p. 47; Destexhe, 1995, pp. 45–46; Kamukama, 1997,45–
46; Luck et al., 1999, p. 583; Mann, 2005, p. 439; Prunier, 1998, p. 93; 
Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, pp. 14–15; Tutu, 1994, p. 8; Uvin, 1998, 
pp. 61–63; Willame 1997, p. 27). The event encouraged the opposition 
significantly. The invasion was initially followed by a wave of arrests 
and murders in the country. Moreover, pressure from the international 
community demanded the Rwandan government to open up the 
democratic process and allow multiparty existence in the country 
(Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 66; Kamukama, 1997, p. 52; Uvin, 1998, pp. 
61–63).  
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The first major incident of violence took place after a night of gunfire 
in Kigali on October 5, 1990. The following day, Habyarimana blamed 
the RPF for the shooting, claiming that the rebels had infiltrated the 
capital. More than 10,000 civilians were arrested, most of them Tutsi, but 
the group also included Hutu opponents to the regime from the central 
and south of the country. The main reaction of the government was to 
use force to counter any move against it (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 66; 
Gatwa, 2005, p. 124; Straus, 2006, p. 192; Uvin, 1998, p. 61–63). This issue 
brought distrust between Tutsi and Hutu. At the beginning of 1991, in 
the northwest of the country, more than 1,200 Tutsi-Bagogwe were 
massacred during reprisals carried out by armed militia close to the 
government. A month after the RPF invasion, Habyarimana spoke to the 
legislature, and allowed the establishment of a multiparty system in the 
country. By July 1991, about twelve new political parties were 
functioning in the country, not only the MDR (Mouvement 
Démocratique pour Républi-quain), the PSD (Parti Social-Démocratique), 
the PL (Parti Libéral), the PDC (Parti Démocrate-Chrétien), and the 
MRND, but also seven smaller parties instigated by Habyarimana, 
possible as a deliberate attempt to make a pretend of multipartism. The 
extremist Hutu CDR (Coalition pour la Défence de la République), 
Coalition for the Defense of the Republic was founded in 1992 and led by 
Martin Bucyana (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 69; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 
152–153).  
However, it is important to note that the history of political parties in 
Rwanda exemplifies primarily ethnic cleavage rather than nationalism or 
ideology. Parties, prior to independence and after, were formed along 
ethnic lines first, and then in accordance with ideology or personalities 
(Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 61). The fighting was fierce but neither side 
could win, and by the end of March 1991, a ceasefire was negotiated 
which included a neutral monitoring group and political talks with the 
president Habyarimana (Adelman & Suhrke, 1995, pp. 66–67; Tutu, 1994, 
p. 9). In March 1992, in the region of Bugesera in the south, Hutus carried 
out a series of attacks against Tutsis, killing around 300 of them. In late 
1992, the campaign against the Tutsi took a new turn. Large-scale 
violence was inaugurated by an inflammatory speech by Dr Léon 
Mugesera, the vice-Chairman of the MRND in Gisenyi. At a rally in 
Kabaya, on November 22, 1992, Mugesera blamed the Tutsis and the 
opposition for betrayal of the country in negotiating with the rebellion of 
the RPF Inkotanyi. Some argue that Mugesera’s speech was to encourage 
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the Hutus to kill Tutsis (Gatwa, 2005, p. 214; Straus, 2006, pp. 196–197). 
The Mugesera speech is frighteningly virulent, a window into the angry, 
radical mindset that ultimately led the hardliners to unleash the genocide 
in April 1994. His main point is that the ruling party is under attack 
externally and internally; the propaganda was that Tutsi were foreigners 
who had come to Rwanda to exploit the rightful occupants (Hutu), and 
they should be sent back through the Nile. To respond to this threat, he 
argued retaliation, unity, and self-defence. He also invoked violence as 
retaliation, as self-protection, and as prevention. His advice of “not 
letting yourself be invaded” was a call for the Rwandan population to 
take the law into its own hands and to defend the country from internal 
and external threats. Following Léon Mugesera’s speech, at the 
beginning of 1993, more than 1,000 people were killed in Ruhengeri and 
Gisenyi (in the northern part of the country). The killings provided a 
pretext to the RPF to attack the cities of Ruhengeri and Ngarama on 
February 8, 1993, stopping 25 miles short of Kigali (Destexhe, 1995, p. 46; 
Gatwa, 2005, p. 125; Straus, 2006, pp. 192–196). 
According to many scholars, Hutu peasants had economic 
motivations for killing Tutsi in the genocide. At the structural level, 
increasing pressure on the land, over-population, ecological degradation, 
and a fall in the price of key export crops such as coffee and tea, are 
mentioned as contributing factors to growing unease, rivalry, and 
conflict between neighbours in Rwanda in the early 1990s (Destexthe, 
1995, p. 13; Tutu, 1994, pp. 6–7; United Nations, 2001, p. 7; Uvin, 1998, 
pp. 107–108). At the individual level, it is reported that this unease and 
conflict made it possible for Interahamwe and the government officials to 
promise material rewards to potential killers, such as property, material 
benefits, cows, and land (Prunier, 1998, p. 142).  
2.3 Social Inequality and Division 
The consequences of the colonialism policies and the church’s “divide 
and rule” principle during colonial times were overall negative 
(Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 87). Because of these policies, many Church 
leaders were very close to political power in the Habyarimana regime, 
and they were perceived as being close to the hard-line Hutu extremist 
ideology (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999, p. 86; Tutu, 1994, p. 67). As a result, 
their priests, pastors, and other Christians participated in killing their 
brothers and sisters in the genocide. Some priests and pastors ran away 
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from their people, remaining inactive; others committed acts of betrayal 
and murder (Adelman & Suhrke , 1999, p. 87; Anderson & Menon, 2009, 
p. 63, Hammond, 1996, p. 24; Mann, 2005, p. 464; Prunier, 1998, p. 253; 
Tutu, 1994, p. 69). After the genocide, some Christians left the church, 
saying that God was no longer there because many Rwandans had died 
in the churches which they had believed to be sanctuaries and havens 
from violence (Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; Hammond, 1996, p. 23; Prunier, 
1998, pp. 253–254; Tutu, 1994, pp. 69–70). Demographers estimate that 
the male fatality rate was 50 percent higher than the female rate. Unlike 
the Nazi’s conception of the Jews, Hutu extremists do not appear to have 
felt that the Tutsi posed a biological threat to the Hutu. Rather, they 
simply argued that virtually all Tutsi were supporters of the RPF. A 
former member of the Interahamwe explained that “they did not have a 
role of exterminating all Tutsi, but it was said that every Tutsi cooperates 
with the RPF”. These conceptions were encouraged after the RPF began 
recruiting heavily from the Tutsi civilian population in Rwanda in late 
1992 (Valentino, 2004, p. 185).  
Scholars agree that all genocides in history have been organised, and 
legitimised by the state (Cook, 2006, p. 3; Destexhe, 1995, p. 25; Mann 
2005, pp. 240–241). In the case of Rwanda, the origins of the genocide are 
rather to be found in the regime’s peasant ideology, which existed long 
before 1990 (Anderson & Menon, 2009, p. 55; Cook, 2006, p. 3). Cook 
argues that when revolutionary leaders espouse a mono-ethnic peasant 
ideology to legitimize their power and want to hold on to that power at 
all cost, genocide may become their ultimate strategy (Cook, 2006, p. 3). 
Education is the key factor leading to the development of understanding, 
attitude and values (Luck et al., 1999, p. 225). However, according to the 
United Nations, the literacy rate was very low and Rwandan education 
suffered from poor quality (Sellström & Wohlgemuth, 1995, p. 9; United 
Nations, 2001, p. 25). The 2002 census showed that the level of education 
in Rwanda still remained in a rudimentary phase: only 60% of the 
population aged 15 years and above could both read and write a text in 
any language. Another 4.4% could only read, while 35.6% could neither 
read nor write. In urban areas of the country, the proportion of literacy 
was higher than in rural areas (76.7% against 56.6%). Men were more 
literate than women (66.5% against 54.7%). Overall, 31% of the resident 
population in Rwanda had never been to school, and those who had 
attended but were at the moment of the study out of school constituted 
45%” (Republic of Rwanda, 2005, pp. 46–47). 
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This alarming disproportion was a strong criterion in predicting mass 
participation in genocide. It was, therefore, easy for propagandist and 
exponents of ethnicity to reach the general populace. Many scholars 
argue that the main agents of the genocide were ordinary peasants who 
belonged to the frustrated uneducated people (Bangwa-nubusa, 2009, p. 
20; Cook, 2006, pp. 163–164; Destexhe 1995, pp. 30–31; Kinloch & Mohan, 
2005, pp. 25–26; Prunier, 1998, p. 247). Furthermore, as Prunier (1998, p. 
245) suggests, “the state can be defined by its monopoly of legitimate 
organized violence.” In a time of war, people who refuse to carry out 
orders to commit acts of violence may be shot. This principle was put in 
practice in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  
Obedience helps individuals to raise a feeling of belonging to the 
group and diminishes feelings of guilt (Destexhe, 1995, p. 34). In the 1994 
Rwanda genocide, killing became normal as a result of economic 
personal rivalries, and a culture of fear or obedience (Cook, 2006, p. 168; 
Sandström, 2005, p. 48). However, scholars note that the Hutu reaction to 
RPF attacks was a consequence rather than obedience to a feared existing 
authority (Cook, 2006, p. 169). In addition, cultural beliefs in a 
supernatural power probably played an important role. Alongside the 
supernatural power, there is a strong belief that the king has all powers 
and what he does is just. The Rwandan people accepted that the king has 
a divine right and sovereignty over the people, because he was born with 
the seeds (Prunier, 1998, p. 245). Ordinary people in Rwanda just 
submitted to the exercise of power by the king. Furthermore, the 
religious societies would accept elite rule on the basis of political 
formulae. Rwanda falls into this category, where the Church has played 
a major role through a number of missions throughout the country 
jointly with previous administrations (Rutayisire, 1987, pp. 27–32). 
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3. Genocide 
3.1 Definition of the Term 
Genocide is a crime that has been committed throughout the ages. 
Indeed, every century of recorded history has been stained by genocidal 
acts. The term genocide has been used on many occasions during the 
course of a conflict, in particular in regard to the Holocaust, but also in 
connection with the Vietnam war, where it was used both by the French 
philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre and by the Russell Tribunal (Destexthe, 
1995, p. 17). Towards the end of the Second World War, when the full 
horror of the extermination and concentration camps became public 
knowledge, Winston Churchill stated that the world was being brought 
face to face with ‘a crime that has no name’. History was of little use in 
finding a recognised word to fit the nature of the crime that Nazi 
Germany, a modern, industrialized state, had engaged in (Destexhe, 
1995, pp. 2–3). According to Raphael Lemkin (a Polish-Jewish jurist who 
lost his entire family in the Holocaust), the term “genocide” signifies ‘the 
destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group’ and implies the existence of 
a coordinated plan, aimed at total extermination, to be put into effect 
against individuals chosen as victims purely, simply and exclusively 
because they are members of the targeted group (Destexhe, 1995, p. 3; 
Totten & Bartrop, 2009, pp. 3–9). Lemkin was arguing that murders could 
not stand behind sovereign immunity by killing their own citizens, and 
that a collective international agreement was required to ensure 
universal repression of barbarity and vandalism. He tried to convince 
American intellectuals and politicians that the Nazi conquest of Europe 
was not only a contest between armies for territory, but also aimed at the 
total destruction of the Jewish people of occupied Europe (Brannigan, 
2013, p. 49). Lemkin’s argument and his single-minded perseve-rance 
brought about the Convention for the Prevention and the Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) which was voted into existence by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948. After stating 
in article 1 that genocide is a crime under international law, the 
Convention laid down the following definition: “Genocide is the mass 
killing of a group of people as defined by article of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) as any of 
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such as killing members of 
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the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group” (Kinloch & Mohan 
,2005, pp. 16−18; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 4; Valentino, 2004, pp. 12–13).  
The Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines genocide 
as the murder of a whole group of people (as killing, bodily or mental 
injury, unlivable conditions, pre-vention of births) calculated to bring 
about the extermination of a nation, race, politics, and cultural group or 
to destroy a language or religious group (Cambridge International 
Dictionary of English, 2002, p. 588; Luck et al., 1999, p. 280) defines 
genocide as a systematic and deliberate destruction of a racial, religious 
or ethnic group (noncombatants) in times of war or peace. According to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), genocide is such 
a serious crime that direct and public encouragement to commit such 
crime must be punished, even where such incitement fails to produce the 
result expected by the perpetrators (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 19). 
In Rwanda, several specific crimes were committed during genocide 
such as conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. All genocide 
perpetrators were constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, and 
private individuals. Their trials were held in the traditional jurisdiction 
Gacaca, and in international tribunals in Arusha (Tanzania), Europe and 
in North America.  
Genocide is a purely human experience, for only man is capable of 
genocide. Yet genocide also brings into question the humanity of man; 
the poison of genocide kills the souls of the perpetrators, sears the hearts 
of the survivors, and eliminates another uniquely human attribute, man’s 
capacity for mercy (Odom, 2005, p. xiii). However, the term genocide has 
progressively lost its initial meaning and the word is becoming 
dangerously commonplace. In order to shock people and gain their 
attention to contemporary situations of violence or injustice by making 
comparison with murder on the greatest scale known in this century, 
‘genocide’ has been used as synonymous with massacre, mass killing, 
oppression and repression, overlooking that what lies behind the image 
it evokes is the attempted annihilation of an entire race or ethnic group 
(Destexthe, 1995, p. 6, Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, pp. 16–18). With regard to 
the issue of “in whole or in part”, studies have debated over what that 
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means in reality. The fact is that no genocide in recent times has ever 
brought the complete extermination of a group of people. The Rwandan 
genocide, of course, intended to eliminate every single Tutsi in the whole 
country, but there were good Hutus who spared and hid some Tutsis 
because they were their friends and relatives. Therefore, it is not 
impossible, of course, for a group, particularly a small indigenous group, 
to be wiped out “in whole”, but to date, at least as far as anyone knows, 
no group has been wiped out as a whole. Even concerning the genocide 
against the Jewish people committed by the Nazis, there are still Jewish 
survivors. This fact is implied by the expression “in part”. However, it is 
genocide even if any of the acts mentioned above are intentionally 
targeting the total destruction of a specific group of people.  
Helen Fein, a pioneer of genocide studies, provided a detailed 
analysis of a host of alternative definitions developed by genocide 
scholars from the fields of psychology, political science, sociology, and 
history. Her proposed definition of genocide is: genocide is the 
calculated murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside the 
universe of obligation of the perpetrator by a government, elite, staff or 
crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity 
perceived to be caused by or impeded by the victim (Fein, 1984, pp. 25–
26; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 37). According to Fein, in order for 
genocide to take place, it has to be organised and authorised by the state 
or kingdom. However, in certain situations, the state or kingdom may 
not be openly involved in the genocide, but it might provide tactics and 
instruct the local authorities about how to do it.  
The genocide convention was adopted in 1948 by the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva; unfortunately, genocides did 
not stop. Genocides occurred during the cold war in Asia (Cambodia 
1975–1979) and in Africa (Rwanda in 1994; Darfur-South Sudan, since 
2003) and in Europe (Srebrenica 1995) (Grûnfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 1). 
Although scholars and interna-tional organisations dealt with the issue 
of early warning signs of gross human rights violations before the 
genocide in Rwanda, the international community has had to 
acknowledge its failure to prevent or even stop this tragedy. The 
international community observed the Rwandan genocide with a 
complex mixture of shock and insignificance. Rwanda was a small and 
strategically unimportant country, and there were no economic interests 
involved (Prunier, 2009, p. 29). The UN Security Council even went so far 
as to reduce its small peacekeeping force which was present in Rwanda 
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during the time of the genocide (UNAMIR, under the command of 
Canadian General Romeo Dallaire) (Grûnfeld and Huijboom, 2007, p. 14; 
Totten & Bartrop, 2009, pp. 327–329).  
Genocides have been perpetrated by and against a wide range of 
nations, culture, forms of government, and ethnic and religious groups. 
According to some studies, between 60 million and 150 million people 
worldwide probably have perished in episode of genocides during the 
twentieth century alone (Valentino, 2004, p. 9). Accordingly, the 
Rwandan genocide is a lesson to the whole world that it is not possible to 
ascertain that there will be no new genocide during the twenty-first 
century. 
3.2 Genocide against the Ethnic Tutsi 
On April 6, 1994, President Juvenal Habyarimana was returning from 
Tanzania where he had attended peace talks in order to secure a ceasefire 
between his government and the rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF). At 20:30, as the presidential plane was approaching Kanombe 
military base in Kigali, three missiles were fired at the plane. The plane 
crashed in the ground of the presidential palace and all on board died: 
President Habyarimana, the Burundian President Cyprian Ntaryamira, 
Rwanda’s Chief of staff Deogratias Nsabimana, several senior members 
of the presidential staff, and members of the French crew that operated 
the plane. The Rwandan government blamed the RPF and the Tutsis for 
killing the president. In retaliation, the Hutu extremist group 
Interahamwe started to kill the Tutsi and Hutu sympathisers (Cook, 2006, 
p. 221; Dallaire, 2003, pp. 223–224; Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; Kamukama, 
1997, p. 88; Kinloch & Mohan, 2005, pp. 187–188; Tutu, 1994, p. 12). 
Although it is not yet known who was behind this assassination, it is 
clear that it acted as the fuse for the eruption of the violence which led to 
the tragedy (Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; Kamukama, 1997, p. 63; Prunier, 1998, 
p. 229).  
The massacre started in Kigali on 7 April 1994 and spread throughout 
the country as groups of militia were sent to different areas to coordinate 
the killings with the government personnel. In little more than 100 days 
in 1994, more than 800,000 Rwandans were butchered in one of the most 
intense genocides in the twenty-first century (Aguilar, 2009, p. 23; 
Anderson & Menon, 2009, p. 54; Dallaire, 2003, p. 375; Hinga et al., 2008, 
p. 49; Prunier, 1998, p. 265; Tutu, 1994, p. 13; Union Africaine, 2000, p. 
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121; United Nations, 2001, p. 7). According to the 1991 Rwandan census, 
Kibuye had the highest concentration of Tutsi within Rwanda. They 
were 252,000 before the genocide. By the end of 1994, there were between 
7,000 and 8,000 Tutsis left in Kibuye. Kibuye is only one of the many 
examples of a systematic annihilation of an ethnic group by fellow 
nationals within Rwanda (Aguilar, 2009, p. 27). In fact, interim president 
Théodore Sindikubwabo expressed his appreciation for the killing of so 
many Tutsis in Kibuye.  
Scholars argue that the genocide placed people in incredibly complex 
moral and social dilemmas (Prunier, 1998, p. 257). In the case of Rwanda, 
some Tutsis could be denounced by somebody who knew them 
personally: pupils were ki lled by their teachers, shop owners by their 
customers, neighbour killed neighbour, and husbands killed wives in 
order to save them from a terrible death. Some people were denounced 
by their colleagues who wanted their jobs, or killed by people who 
wanted their property, while others were saved by unknown Hutu 
disgusted by the violence (Cook, 2006, pp. 182–183; Destexhe, 1995, p. 31; 
Prunier, 1998, p. 257). Frequent intermarriage had produced many Hutu-
looking Tutsis and Tutsi-looking Hutus. In towns and in some rural 
areas, Hutus who looked like Tutsis were very often killed; their denials 
and proffered cards with the ‘right’ ethnic mentioning being seen as a 
typical Tutsi deception (Prunier, 1998, p. 249). The Hutu killers 
Interahamwe turned against their fellow Hutus who tried to save Tutsis, 
and the vast majority of Hutus abandoned their homes and fled the 
country to Zaïre (now DRC) as a result of propaganda-inspired fear of 
RPF reprisals (Anderson & Menon, 2009, p. 54; Destexhe, 1995, p. 33; 
Mugerwa, 2000, p. 7). A Hutu husband might have to give all his money 
to be allowed not to kill his Tutsi wife and her relatives when they were 
stopped at militia roadblock (Prunier, 1998, p. 257).  
3.3 Social Suffering during Genocide and Displacement 
Armed conflicts, especially genocides, profoundly damage social, 
physical, and human psychological health in countries and impede their 
economic growth during and after the conflict (Stewart, Cindy, & 
Michael, 2001). The World Health Organisation argues that social 
suffering is a public health problem (WHO, 2002, p. 3). Collective 
suffering intensifies mortality and illness in conflict war zones; 10% of 
the people who are killed in contemporary warfare are soldiers; and 90% 
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are civilians, including vulnerable children, women, and people 
belonging to socially oppressed groups (Joop & De Jong, 2010; Kleinman, 
Das, & Lock, 1997). Social suffering produces tremendous psychological 
as well as physical injuries and increases the burdens of diseases 
associated with negative mental health outcomes (Baingana, Banon & 
Thomas, 2005). Therefore, social suffering may cause a wide range of 
human problems. Systematic or targeted violence such as genocide and 
torture expose the victims to an enormous psychological trauma. The 
victims experience multiple adversities and losses, often accompanied by 
forced displacement (Elbert & Schauer, 2002).  
Suffering is an unavoidable part of being a human, and an experience 
most people will experience sooner or later (Kleinman et al., 1997, p. ix). 
However, in war and genocide, suffering is extreme. As an example, the 
use of systematic rape is common; it is often organised and used in order 
to annihilate the targeted ethnic group (Natalya, 2014, p. 151). During the 
1994 genocide, systematic sexual molestation, mutilation, and rape of 
Tutsi women and girls were used as a tool to humiliate and annihilate 
the ethnic Tutsi (Amnesty International, 2004; Hamel, 2016). According 
USAID (United States Agency for International Development), after the 
genocide, some Hutu women were also sexually abused by RPF soldiers 
in revenge for what Hutu men previously had done (Newburg & 
Baldwin, 2000, p. 4). The Rwandan women who were raped are 
marginalised, and the children that are born as consequences of rape are 
not accepted in their communities (Mukangendo, 2007, p. 47). Through 
the process of stigmatisation, certain individuals are systematically 
excluded from particular social benefits because they possess a certain 
characteristic or belong to the enemy group (Bloom & Kessler, 1994; 
Major & Schmader, 1998; Steele & Aromson, 1995; Weitz, 1990). 
Therefore, raped Tutsi wives of imprisoned Hutu men are marginalised 
and excluded from genocide survivor organisations, because the 
members do not perceive these women as true survivors (Burnet, 2012, p. 
139). A stigma arises during a social interaction when a child’s actual 
social identity does not meet the community’s normative expectations of 
the qualities that the child should possess (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). 
Elliot, Ziegler, Altman, and Scott (1982) suggested that a stigma is a form 
of deviance that leads others to judge an individual as illegitimate for 
participation in an interaction.  
The stigmatisation process might be distinctive in the context of 
intergroup aggression when members of advantaged groups 
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systematically exclude out-group members from economic and social 
benefits (Sidanius, 1993). Thus, Rwandan children born of rape are 
stigmatised not simply because they are evaluated negatively or possess 
the blood of their fathers, but rather because they possess a characteristic 
viewed by the community as constituting a basis for avoiding (Kurzban 
& Leary, 2001). The stigmatisation of children born of rape has become 
an alarming characteristic of modern society, both in the developing and 
the developed world. As a matter of concern, studies have found that 
parents’ negative perceptions of children have damaging effects on their 
behavioural development and school performance (Patterson, Shaw, 
Stewart-Brown, 2009; Van Ee, Kleber, & Mooren, 2012; Weitz, 1990). In 
many cases, due to violence at home, children are inclined to become 
street children, drug abusers, beggers, and criminals. Twenty-four years 
after the Rwandan tragedy, reconciliation is still a big challenge for 
Rwandan people, both in the country and abroad (Nowrojee, 2005, p. 4). 
3.4 Trauma and Healing 
The concept of trauma has been described as the mental scar that a tragic 
event leaves on an individual victim or on a witness – sometimes even on 
the perpetrators. A trauma may also be seen as the collective imprint on 
a group of a tragic historical experience that may have occurred decades, 
generations, or even centuries ago (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009, p. xi). 
Trauma is an uncontrolled reaction to the traumatic experience that 
people have gone through. In Kinyarwanda, the language spoken in 
Rwanda, the trauma from the genocide is called ihahamuka or ibikomere 
byo mu mutima, which refers to a variety of mental and emotional 
manifestations originating from the violence against the Tutsis and its 
aftermath. Thus, trauma is the result of exposure to an overwhelmingly 
stressful event or a series of events, such as war, genocide, rape or abuse, 
and it is a normal response by normal people to an abnormal situation 
(Langberg, 1999, pp. 52−53; Schilraldi, 2000, p. 3).  
In the present study, the healing strategies and community resources 
utilised by Rwandan people in Finland and Belgium have been 
investigated. Most international organisations base their trauma 
counselling on the Western model, but because they were unfamiliar 
with or even ignored Rwandan culture, many traumatised Rwandans 
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have turned to traditional and religious healers to seek help. Therefore, 
the trauma healing and coping practices and facilities in Finland and 
Belgium have been explored and compared. Unlike their traumatised 
Rwandans in Rwanda, Rwandans in Belgium and Finland do not 
necessarily have regular access to traditional and religious healers; but 
there are persons and organisations in the community, for example 
pastors and churches, that provide spiritual and emotional support and 
consultation. According to Friedman, Keane, and Resick (2007), cultural 
competency skills are essential to either effectively treat or research any 
medical condition, and especially psychiatric disorders, because of the 
interplay between culture and concepts of health or illness, expressions 
of distress, and healing beliefs and practices. They argue that across all 
diseases and illnesses, culture determines the local expression of 
symptoms (idioms of distress and illness behaviour), illness attributions, 
coping, locally sanctioned treatments, as well as the acceptance of 
treatments; both Western and non-Western (Friedman et al. 2007, p. 425).  
All in all, the existence of a collective trauma speaks of the painful link 
connecting peoples’ present to their past. It defines the empirical way in 
which contemporary societies problematize the meaning of their moral 
responsibility in relation to the distress of the world. 
3.5 Western Justice 
After the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis in 1994, the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council established an International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, to prosecute 
individuals responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law that were committed during the period 
from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994 (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1123; 
Grûnfeld and Huijboom, 2007, p. 18; Moghalu, 2005, pp. 153–156). In 
creating the ICTR, the Security Council affirmed its conviction that the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violation of international 
humanitarian law in Rwanda would promote a number of goals:  
(a) to bring justice to those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, 
(b) to contribute to the process of national reconciliation, 
(c) to restore and maintain peace in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region 
of Africa in general,  
(d) to prevent future violations and effectively redress such violations 
that have been committed.  
33 
In order for the ICTR to fulfil its mandate, the Security Council 
exhorted that it should receive the assistance of all states. An article of 
the statute requires states to cooperate with the ICTR in its investigations 
and prosecutions, if a request for assistance is issued. Suspects indicted 
by the ICTR have been arrested in many African and Europen countries 
and transferred to the ICTR, demonstrating the respect and support 
foreign national governments exhibit toward the tribunal (Grûnfeld & 
Huijboom 2007, p. 19; Totten & Bartrop 2009, p. 474). Article 2 of the 
ICTR statute deals with genocide, conceptualized as acts committed with 
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious group. This article is similar to article 2 and 3 of the 1948 
genocide convention, in which genocide is defined as specific crimes 
against humanity committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or 
religious grounds (Totten & Bartrop 2009, p. 474). The ICTR has been 
able to deliberate in an extensive way on the exact meaning of the article 
3. This article declares that the following acts shall be punishable:  
(a) genocide, 
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide, 
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
(d) attempt to commit genocide, 
(e) complicity in genocide.  
The ICTR’s first trial began on January 9, 1997, and on June 17, 1997, trial 
chamber 1 permitted the prosecutor to amend Akayezu, who was Mayor 
of the commune Taba, to be the first person who was convicted for direct 
and indirect incitement to genocide. His conviction was based on a 
speech that he made on 19 April 1994 in his commune, in which he was 
encouraging the population to eliminate their enemies, the accomplices 
of the inkotanyi (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1131; Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007, 
p. 19). The ICTR ruled that Akayezu’s speech was understood by the 
community as an invitation to kill the Tutsi population, and that 
Akayezu himself was aware of the impact of his statements. The tribunal 
ruled that there was a causal relationship between Akayezu’s speech and 
the killings of the Tutsi minority (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1131; Grünfeld & 
Huijboom, 2007, p. 19; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 484).  
The second ICTR trial on genocide suspects took place in Belgium in 
2001 with four accused Rwandans: two nuns, a professor of physics at 
the national university of Rwanda, and a businessman. The court found 
three of the accused guilty of genocide and sentenced them to jail terms 
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varying from twelve to twenty years (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1162). Even 
though the RPF soldiers saved tens of thousands of Tutsis from 
annihilation, the RPF had also killed thousands, including 
noncombatants as well as government troops and members of militia. In 
defeating the genocidal government, RPF soldiers reportedly killed 
thousands of civilians in violation of international humanitarian law (Des 
Forges, 1999, pp. 1073–1187; Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 197–198; Totten & 
Bartrop, 2009, p. 331). The RPF-Inkotanyi killed tens of thousands of 
innocent Hutu civilians before and after the genocide, apparently 
provoked by vengeance against suspected killers of Tutsi and collective 
reprisal against Hutu (Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 197–198; Punier, 2009, pp. 42–
46; Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 331).  
In Zaire (DRC), the supporters of the genocide activated conflicts 
against people of Tutsi origin, destabilising the country. The security 
implications for Rwanda and the intermittent massacres perpetrated at 
the border were among the factors that led the Rwandan army to help 
Laurent Kabila to overthrow the government of Mobutu and perpetrate 
genocidal massacres against the refugees who had been driven east, 
away from the Rwandan borders. According to some studies, the 
Security Council took no action after being given evidence that both the 
government of the Congo and Rwanda were responsible of killings of 
Hutu refugees in Eastern Congo (United Nations, 2001; Prunier, 2009, pp. 
116–125). 
The chief prosecutor of the ICTR announced in 2002 that she had 
launched investigations of several high-ranking RPF officers for such 
crimes, but the Rwandan government responded by imposing new travel 
restrictions for Rwandans, making it impossible for some witnesses to 
leave Rwanda and travel to Arusha-Tanzania to testify in court. As a 
result, the ITCR had to suspend three trials in June 2002 for the lack of 
witnesses (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 1131–1132). When a European Union 
delegation visited Rwanda in June 1998, the British Minister of state 
Tony Lloyd said that European countries were discussing how to ensure 
that every suspect of being a genocide perpetrator is arrested in every 
European country. Dozens of such genocide suspects are living in 
Europe and North America. Hundreds of others are in various African 
countries. Although some African states have arrested a number of 
genocide suspects who were transferred to the International tribunal, 
none has yet shown a willingness to begin genocide trials in their own 
courts (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1163).  
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With the Security Council pressing the ICTR to bring its prosecutions 
to a swift conclusion, no RPF soldiers have yet been indicted or brought 
to trial, raising doubts as to whether anyone from the RPF will ever face 
prosecution in an international court for crimes during 1994. This 
prosecution of accused from only one ethnic Rwandan group has given 
the impression to some people that the tribunal is working in the interest 
of one side only (Brannigan, 2013, p. 63; Des Forges, 1999, pp. 1174-1154). 
Furthermore, the ICTR and Rwandan traditional justice Gacaca was 
unable to deal with RPF crimes and revenge-killings by Tutsi civilians 
(Kapteijns & Richters, 2010, p. 180; Moghalu, 2005, p. 3).This issue brings 
further division among the Hutu and Tutsi diaspora in Finland and 
Belgium, because there is a deep longing among the Hutu population for 
acknowledgement of their own suffering during the violence. However, 
Western justice had played an important role in promoting 
accountability for perpetrators of the genocide; this has had an important 
impact on the Rwandan diaspora, which closely follows the events in 
their home country. In addition, Western justice has played an important 
role to Rwandan diaspora groups regarding their trauma healing. Some 
perpetrators have been prosecuted in Western countries, such as 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA (Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 
473).  
As of early 2004, the ICTR had convicted twelve individuals including 
a number of senior members of Rwandan government, civil society, and 
clergy. Convicted individuals include Jean Kambanda, the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda during the genocide; Jean-Paul Akayesu and Juvenal 
Kajelijeli, both local mayors; Georges Rutaganda, a militia leader; 
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a Seventh- Day Advantist pastor; and George 
Ruggiu, a Belgian-born radio journalist whose broadcasts encouraged the 
setting up of roadblocks and congratulated those who massacred Tutsi at 
these roadblocks (Totten & Bartrop, 2009, p. 478).  
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4. Population and Aim of the Study 
4.1 The Rwandan Diaspora in Finland and Belgium 
According to National Statistical Bureau, outside the African continent, 
Belgium has ranked number one in taking Rwandan refugees (Schildt, 
2013, p. 17). Belgium has a particular status owning to the fact that it not 
only hosts the largest community of Rwandans living in Europe, or more 
generally in the Western countries, but also to the historical ties between 
the former Rwandan elite and its Belgian counterparts. Among the 
educated class in Rwanda in 1994, a very significant percentage of those 
who had studied abroad, through government scholarships or through 
private means, or who had gone overseas for professional training 
courses, had studied and trained in Belgium. This contact also applied to 
the army and national gendarmerie, as much as some of them conducted 
their academic, medical professional, and other training courses in 
Belgium. In addition, large numbers of Belgians lived in Rwanda before 
and during 1994, working in different organisations in the private 
sectors, in NGOs, schools, in the church, and in government institutions. 
Accordingly, Belgians and Rwandans worked together for many years, 
both in Rwanda and in Belgium, creating strong ties at both the 
professional and personal level (Prunier, 1998, p. 33).  
When the ex-FAR (Force d’Armé Rwandaise) crossed en masse into 
Zaïre (now DRC) in mid-July 1994, a number of senior officers spent only 
a very short time in the camps in Congo before Belgian friends and 
former colleagues, and possibly also some Rwandan relatives living in 
Belgium, made the necessary arrangements for them to travel to 
Belgium, where they have remained ever since. According to a study by 
Schildt (2013, p. 17), by 2012, the number of Rwandans living in Belgian 
territory was 30.000−40.000. They had 1035 projects: shops, cleaning 
companies, travel agencies, restaurants and bars, churches, and saloons. 
Even though there have been historical ties between Rwanda and 
Belgium, asylum seekers and immigrant Rwandans coming to Belgium 
since 1990 has increased remarkably. These refugees and their families 
have been placed in different parts of the country; however, Brussels has 
attracted the majority of them. Both Hutus and Tutsis live in Belgium 
(Schildt, 2013, p. 25; Udahemuka 2012). However, there were still 
divisions between the Rwandans living in the diaspora. For instance, 
Tutsi and Hutu in Belgium had their own separate areas, bars and 
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churches, in which a person from the one of the ethnic groups could not 
enter if it belonged to the other group, because they had been severely 
traumatised and thought that members of the other group were all killers 
(Omaar, 2008, pp. 191–194; Udahemuka, 2012). Moreover, many 
Rwandans in Belgium are extremely opposed to the current Rwandan 
government. These Rwandans left the country around July 1994, and 
they are associated with and supported by Belgians who lived and 
worked in Rwanda before 1994; they have since then rarely or never 
returned to the country (Schildt, 2013, p. 25). In addition, there have been 
mutual accusations among Rwandans in exile, and some are suspected of 
spying on other refugees for the Rwandan government. For example, in 
Belgium, Great Britain, and Sweden, authorities have discovered subtle 
activities among some Rwandans spying on their nationals for the 
current regime (Cuffe, 2011; Meldrum, 2012; Milmo, 2011; Wizeye, 2015). 
At the same time, there have been reports of accusations made against 
some Rwandan nationals who are said to be hiding from justice in 
countries such as Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
England, France, Germany, Malawi, Norway, Kenya, USA, Sweden, 
Zambia, and South Africa.  
Since Finland has not previously had any significant ties with 
Rwanda, only a few Rwandans came to Finland to study or to apply for 
political asylum. According to Statistics Finland (1990−2017), by 2018, 
Finland hosted 503 (254 males and 249 females) Rwandans who came 
both as refugees, students and on other grounds. In 1994, during the 
Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis, there was only one single 
Rwandan individual in Finland. He came to Finland through a church 
connection (Finnish Baptist church in Vaasa - Union Baptist in Rwanda). 
The first Rwandan asylum seekers came to Finland in 1995, and the 
process has continued up to the present date (Holmberg, 2009, p. 25; 
Statistics Finland, 1990–2017). They came from different parts of Africa: 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Malawi, Kenya, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. They are both 
Tutsis and Hutus. According to Statistics Finland (1990–2017), Rwandan 
people in Finland are living in the following municipalities: Helsinki, 
Espoo, Oulu, Turku, Vaasa, Kotka, Lappeenranta, Porvoo, Kokkola, 
Savonlinna, and Vantaa. They also work in many different sectors: health 
care, public transport, education, social care, cleaning, restaurants, post, 
and industries.  
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Rwandan people do not have many economic projects in Finland. 
Some are unemployed, and others are retired. With respect to religious 
affiliation, some are church goers (Roman Catholic Church, Mission 
Church, Pentecostal Church, Methodist Church, and Lutheran) and other 
animists. There have not been any ethnic clashes among Rwandans in 
Finland. However, there is still a lack of trust between the different 
ethnic groups, which may be noticed at the individual level. As a result, 
people may be reluctant to interact and visit each other, or to participate 
in events such as weddings and burials (Turner, 2012, p. 138). 
4.2 Aim of the Thesis 
The research aims to study social suffering experienced and expressed by 
the survivors of the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath who nowadays 
reside in the diaspora both in Finland and Belgium. More particular aims 
are to (a) provide an analysis of the role of the church before and after 
the genocide, (b) explore how frequent various forms of traumatic 
experiences during the genocide are among member of the diaspora in 
Finland, (c) compare the mental well-being of victims of rape during the 
genocide with the mental well-being of those who were born as a result 
of such rape, and (d) investigate coping methods and compare services 
aiming at trauma healing among genocide victims in Belgium and in 
Finland. It puts an emphasis on the experience and narratives of 
Rwandan migrants, on how they conceptualize and give meaning to 
their social suffering, and how they cope with their traumatic situation 
psychologically, in culturally meaningful ways. By studying Rwandans 
in Finland and Belgium, the researcher hopes to contribute to the 
understanding of how a healing process takes place among a highly 
traumatized diasporic group, in its specific cultural context. 
Anthropological and psychological studies have shown that for various 
reasons, the Western model of coping strategies and psychological 
treatment may not be suited to African contexts (Brewis, 2008; 
Tiilikainen, 2003). Instead, traditional and religious healing, religious 
communities, and storytelling events, have been reported to be effective 
means of dealing with traumatic memories (Neimeyer, 2001; Schiraldi, 
2000).  
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5. Method 
5.1 Mixed Methods Design 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies was 
applied in order to approach the research interests of this study. The 
quantitative data were collected with a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. 
A variety of outcomes were in focus in the four articles (Studies I to IV), 
which were assessed in different ways by using various indicators and 
measurements. The use of different study designs and methods within 
this research project was motivated by the fact that social suffering and 
healing is a multi-dimensional concept (Luttrell, 2010, pp. 1−2). One 
commonly mentioned benefit of using mixed methods is that the 
methods may strengthen the internal and external validity of the 
research (Bryman, 2006; Morse & Niehaus, 2009). Therefore, Study I used 
documental analysis of existing literature in combination with interviews 
in order to understand the role of religion regarding the 1994 genocide 
against the Tutsis and its aftermath (Yin, 2014). In the other three studies, 
qualitative methods were also used in addition to the quantitative ones 
to better comprehend the actions and practice in which Rwandan 
individuals engage in everyday life and the meanings they ascribe to 
their experience (Layder, 1993). Otherwise, Studies II to IV were based 
on quantitative data collected with questionnaires. 
The main reason to collect the data in both Finland and Belgium was 
that the Rwandan diaspora residing in Finland is a relatively small 
community with little formal organisation, while the opposite is the case 
in Belgium. Belgium has a historical tie with Rwandan people, it has a 
huge Rwandan community, and it has many Rwandan churchgoers and 
schools, which could easily be contacted for data collection. The data 
collection was carried out over a period of 13 months: 6 months in 
Finland and 7 months in Belgium. 
5.2 Data Analysis 
Mixed methods for data analyses were applied due to the variation in 
study design and data material used in this thesis. In Study I, the data 
were analysed by using inductive or “open” coding (Bernard, 2006, p. 
493), and the qualitative results were thematically presented. In Study II, 
statistical differences between, for instance, males and females were not 
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calculated due to the small sample size. Quantitative results are therefore 
presented in the form of frequencies only. Qualitative data were 
thematically grouped together (e.g. responses concerning traumatic 
experiences; help from Finnish authorities; counselling and coping 
strategies; hope and reconciliation; and forgiveness). In Study III, two 
separate multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) were conducted, 
with eight dependent variables each: the dependent variables measured 
symptoms of trauma and ways of coping with trauma. In the first 
MANOVA, women who had been raped during the genocide or its 
aftermath were compared with women who had not been raped, who 
served as controls. Children born as a result of rape were compared with 
participants who were not born as a result of rape. In Study IV, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to measure 
differences between Rwandans living in Belgium and in Finland on the 
thirteen dependent variables of the study, with age as the covariate. 
5.3 Ethical Considerations 
Due to the potential sensitivity of the questions and the vulnerability of 
the target group, ethical questions were considered very carefully. The 
respondents were informed of the purpose and procedure of the study, 
and understood that their participation was voluntary and that no 
consequences would follow if they refused to participate in it (World 
Medical Association, 2013). Further-more, real names, occupations, or 
other identifying facts were not collected. Complete anonymity was 
guaranteed. The author’s own background as a Rwandan was an asset as 
it enhanced access to the field, but it also brought forth ethical challenges 
that were considered carefully during the whole research process. The 
study adheres to the principles concerning human research ethics of the 
Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013), as well as to 
the guidelines for responsible conduct of research issued by the Finnish 
Advisory Board on Research Integrity (2012).  
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6. Overview of the Original Studies 
This section gives a brief overview of research findings and the 
theoretical contribution of each article separately. More detailed 
information is found in the original publications. 
6.1 The Dual Role of Religion Regarding the Rwandan 1994 
Genocide: Both Instigator and Healer 
6.1.1 Aim and Research Questions 
In 1994, Rwanda experienced a genocide in which an estimated 800,000 
people were killed during a little more than 100 days. Basically, Hutu 
hardliners killed Tutsis, and Tutsi sympathizers among the Hutus. Study 
I explores the complex role of religion regarding the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide and its aftermath. There is evidence to suggest that religion 
played a crucial role in helping to create the conditions which made the 
genocide possible in the first place. This argument is presented through 
an analysis of existing literature and documents on the matter, in 
combination with interviews with members of the Rwandan diaspora in 
Belgium (n = 291, 141 men and 150 women). The respondents had come 
to Belgium either as refugees or on other grounds after the 1994 
genocide. At the time of the interview, they were staying in different 
locations of Belgium: Brussels, Aalst, Liege, Leuven, Charleroi, Limburg, 
Luxembourg, Namur, Turnhout, Soignies, Sint Niklaas, Tielt and 
Vervières. 
6.1.2 Findings 
The churches of the former colonial times, both Catholic and Protestant, 
favored the Tutsis and oppressed the Hutus, thereby laying the ground 
for the future catastrophe. On the other hand, seemingly paradoxically, 
religion has also played a central role in the trauma healing process 
among the genocide survivors. Members of the Rwandan diaspora in 
Belgium were interviewed about their experiences of the genocide and 
its aftermath.  
The Rwandans in Belgium still feel traumatized 24 years after the 
genocide against the Tutsis and its aftermath. Many Rwandans in 
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Belgium lost one or many members of their families: siblings, parents, 
wives, husbands, children, neighbors, friends, and property. Many of 
them spent time as refugees in another African country, especially in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where they were severely 
traumatized when they were forcibly repatriated back to Rwanda by the 
Rwandan army; some were imprisoned without any reason or criminal 
charges. However, religion has been successfully used as a coping and 
healing mechanism for genocide survivors among the Rwandan diaspora 
in Belgium. 
Regarding peace and reconciliation, this study showed that Rwandans 
in Belgium are to a large extent still ethnically divided and feel hatred 
toward individuals from the other ethnic group. Ethnicity still rules their 
hearts. Furthermore, the study revealed that many Tutsis still believe 
that all Hutus have killed or participated in the genocide against the 
Tutsis, and this belief is a severe obstacle against reconciliation. It was 
felt that reconciliation among the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium will take 
long to achieve, albeit there are already individuals who have been able 
to reconcile with the people who killed their relatives. 
6.2 Trauma Inflicted by Genocide: Experiences of the 
Rwandan Diaspora in Finland 
6.2.1 Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of the study was to gain understanding about how Rwandans 
living in Finland were affected by the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, 
and the degree of traumatization and suffering they feel during their 
displacement. Another aim was to investigate to what extent they have 
received counselling in Finland, and what other means they use for 
coping with their trauma. Furthermore, the respondents were asked 
about how reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis living in Finland 
may be achieved, if at all, and their hopes for the future. Qualitative and 
quantitative data was collected through interviews of 40 Rwandans, 
twenty males and twenty females. The respondents were from the 
following locations in Finland: Helsinki, Espoo, Turku, Vaasa, Kotka, 
Lappeenranta, Lohja, Oulu, Porvoo, Kokkola, Savonlinna, Salo, Tuusula, 
and Vantaa. 
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6.2.2 Findings 
The results show that many Rwandans in Finland had lost one or more 
family member, friends, neighbours, and property during the 1994 
genocide against the Tutsi. In the sample, 35 % reported being 
traumatized, and an additional 37.5 % extremely traumatized. 27.5 % 
reported having sleeping problems often and an additional 22.5 % 
reported having sleeping problems very often. Twenty-five percent 
reported having bad dreams sometimes, 30 % often, and 20 % very often. 
Thirty percent of women and 5 % of men reported having been raped. Of 
these, 15 % of the women became pregnant due to the rape, and 10 % 
were contaminated with HIV/AIDS. Ten percent of the respondents were 
born as a result of rape. Although 50 % reported living peacefully with 
other Rwandans, 35 % considered reconciliation difficult or extremely 
difficult. The findings of this research show that the violence of the 1994 
genocide and its aftermath left many Rwandans in the diaspora in 
Finland profoundly traumatized.  
Among Rwandans in Finland, there is still anger and hatred against 
those who brought this trauma upon them. They cannot understand how 
a person could kill his neighbours, classmates, teachers, co-workers, and 
friends. Hutus again are angry because they are not able to honour and 
remember their own lost beloved ones publically, and their suffering is 
not recognized.  
According to the findings of this study, many members of the 
Rwandan diaspora in Finland want to participate in peace building and 
reconciliation among themselves. Some Rwandans were given the 
opportunity to talk to Finnish psychologists, and they benefited from the 
therapy that they were given, but they wish that Finnish authorities 
would arrange camps and conferences on trauma and that Rwandans in 
Finland may meet often in order to discuss their traumatic experiences. 
Many Rwandans in Finland argue that Finnish authorities should talk 
to asylum seekers in order to know about their good and bad 
experiences. With regard to recon-ciliation, the Finnish social system and 
how Finns treat each other are good learning examples for Rwandans in 
Finland. The respondents felt that Finnish authorities should fight 
against racism and show love towards immigrants, because people who 
are traumatised feel even worse if they face racism. Finnish authorities 
should give more time for integration to immigrants to familiarize with 
the system, due to what some refugees have gone through. According to 
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the interviewed Rwandans, three years of integration is a short period 
for people who have been severely traumatised.  
6.3 The Trauma of Women Who Were Raped and Children 
Who Were Born as a Result of Rape during the Rwandan 
Genocide: Cases from the Rwandan Diaspora 
6.3.1 Aim and Research Questions 
In the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi population, systematic sexual 
molestation, mutilation and rape of Tutsi women and girls were used as 
a tool to terrorize and annihilate the ethnic Tutsis. The aim of the third 
study was twofold: to investigate (1) the trauma experienced by women 
who were raped and (2) the trauma of children born as a result of rape, 
during the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis and its aftermath, 
who are staying in Finland and Belgium. 
6.3.2 Findings 
The research showed that the women who had been raped experienced a 
much more severe trauma than the children who were born as a result of 
rape. Children who were born as a result of rape during the 1994 
genocide or its aftermath were much less traumatized than the women 
who had been raped. These findings were perhaps somewhat surprising, 
considering previous results on so-called “war babies” (Balorda, 2004; 
Carpenter, 2010). 
The children born as a result of rape reported having less fears than 
the controls; they also reported, to a higher extent than the controls, that 
they could love and forgive the perpetrators of the genocide. On five of 
the eight variables, there was no significant difference between them and 
the controls. However, they reported using alcohol as a way of coping 
compared to the controls. Their trauma is mostly a result of the 
differential treatment they received from their mothers, family, and 
community. 
For the mothers, raising a child born from rape involves many 
challenges. Throughout their lives, they have had to face stigmatization 
from spouses, family, and community; and in many cases, they 
questioned their own identity within the community. However, some 
women who had gone through counselling had a happy relationship 
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with their children born as a result of rape. Thus, for these women, their 
children provided a meaning to their survival of the 1994 genocide as 
well as a purpose to go on living in the present. There are some women 
survivors of rape that have turned to alcohol and drugs to help them to 
cope with their PTSD. 
Some Rwandan women had started to view their children born as a 
result of rape as a gift rather than a curse. Thus, if these women could 
build a good relationship with their children, there is hope that these 
relationships may act as a good model for Rwandan reconciliation in 
Finland and Belgium. 
6.4 Coping Strategies and Psychological Interventions 
among Traumatized African Migrants in the Western 
World: A Comparison between Rwandans in Finland 
and Belgium 
6.4.1 Aim and Research Questions 
The objective of the fourth study was to investigate coping strategies and 
the experience of mental health interventions in Rwandans traumatised 
by their experiences during the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, living in 
Belgium and Finland.  
6.4.2 Findings 
Relatively few Rwandans reported having been able to receive 
counselling from Finnish and Belgian psychologists. Among them, there 
was a substantial number of respondents who claimed that they did not 
benefit from the counselling they received. Many of the respondents 
argued that Belgian and Finnish authorities should talk to asylum 
seekers more, in order to get to know about their good and bad 
experiences. They feel that they need to be listened to.  
The results showed that Rwandans in Belgium were more satisfied 
than those living in Finland with the therapeutic interventions, 
survivors’ group activities, and social support they had received in their 
host country. Rwandans in Finland, on the other hand, relied more on 
psychopharmaca and the use of alcohol as coping mechanisms than 
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those living in Belgium. It appears that they suffered more from their 
trauma, due to loneliness and the language barrier. 
In Belgium, there is a big Rwandan community with many 
restaurants, bars and associations, where Rwandans can meet and 
discuss their issues. Being a French speaking country, it is easier for 
Rwandans to integrate into Belgium’s system and culture, while in 
Finland; it takes three years to learn the country’s language and 
understand the culture. This might be one reason why there appear to be, 
in relative terms, more traumatized Rwandans in Finland in comparison 
with Belgium.  
There could be more and better efforts from both Belgian and Finish 
authorities to reconcile Rwandans who live in their country. They should 
fight against racism and show concern towards immigrants, because 
people who are already traumatised on their arrival to Europe get even 
more troubled if they also have to face racism in their new country. 
Rwandans in the diaspora suggest that Belgian and Finnish authorities 
should organize activities such as conferences, games, seminars, sports, 
summer camps, etc., so that Rwandans can discuss their problems, as 
part of the reconciliation and healing process. 
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7. Conclusive Remarks 
Much has been written about the Rwandan genocide and its violation of 
human rights during the 1994 genocide against Tutsis and its aftermath. 
The studies included in this thesis will hopefully provide additional 
information, in particular from a psychotraumatological point of view.  
The data collection was not always easy to conduct. The genocide 
occurred 24 years ago, and some respondents said that they wanted to 
forget their experiences and move on. Some feared that narrating their 
terrible memories could have a negative impact on their present lives. 
This may be a reason why some were hesitant to be interviewed or to 
speak publicly about the happenings of 1994. Some Rwandans in 
Belgium even asked the researcher if he was sent by the current 
Rwandan government to spy on them. 
It is clear from the results that the healing process is not over for most 
of the respondents. One reason may be that they to large extent have not 
received counselling, and they have not yet made peace with the 
situation. According to World Medical Association (2013), it is 
unavoidable that a researcher would be confronted with ethical 
dilemmas during a research process of this kind. Regarding peace and 
reconciliation, this study showed that the Rwandans in the diaspora are 
still, to a large extent, ethnically divided and feel hatred toward 
individuals from the other ethnic group. Ethnicity still rules their hearts. 
It was expressed that reconciliation among the Rwandan diaspora will 
take long to achieve, albeit there are already individuals who have been 
able to reconcile with the people who killed their relatives.  
These studies also aimed at identifying psychologically and culturally 
relevant methods and strategies to enhance the healing process among 
traumatized Rwandans in the diaspora. Therefore, it may hopefully 
serve as a tool for improving relations and communication among the 
communities during social and employment interactions, not only in 
Finland and Belgium, but also elsewhere in the world. For Rwandans in 
Finland and Belgium, this study could hopefully work as a bridge-
builder between the ethnic groups. It also shows how the authorities of 
the migrant-receiving countries better could support the traumatised 
Rwandan migrants. This study could be of practical relevance for various 
international relief organisations such as the UNHCR, the Red Cross, 
Médecins Sans Frontières, and the Lutheran World Foundation, as well 
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as medical organisations that work with African immigrants. It could be 
beneficial for teachers who work with refugees. In addition, this research 
provides a deeper understanding of local concepts of mental illness, 
which is of utmost importance in the planning of future aid projects in 
East and Central African conflict zones. Finally, this study contributes to 
the literature on migrants, in particular, African migrants in Finland and 
Europe.   
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